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INTRODUCTION 
orty years ago, modern Spain was born. On December 29, 1978, 
the Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain came into force, 
following ratification by the people of Spain earlier that month and 
sanction by King Juan Carlos on the prior day. Its publication in the 
Boletín Oficial del Estado, the official state gazette, was the final step 
in the constitutional process that had included nearly two years of 
drafting, debate, and passage by the Congress of Deputies and Senate 
in their role as the Spanish constituent assembly. Most notably, the 
coming into force of the Constitution marked the end of Spain’s 
transition from the decades-long authoritarian dictatorship of Francisco 
Franco to constitutional democracy. As the last Western European 
country to adopt constitutional democracy, the Spanish transition 
brought a long delayed conclusion to the era of fascism that had rent 
Europe asunder since Spain (with Italy and Germany) fell to 
totalitarianism in the early twentieth-century.1 
Since that time, the particular process by which Spain accomplished 
its democratic transition has attracted considerable attention from other 
nascent democracies. Spain’s relatively peaceful transformation from 
Franco-era dictatorship to modern constitutional democracy can 
provide a notable and appealing model for other countries’ democratic 
transitions. Spain achieved a “lawful revolution” without a sharp 
disruption to existing state institutions, despite a dramatic 
reformulation of its governing processes and significantly reformed 
national values. The transition’s decision-making was typified by 
“moderation” with a stabilizing “commitment to democratic rules,”2 
and the results were accomplished through interparty consensus and 
intraparty discipline.3 This type of transition is known as the Spanish 
Model.4 It is a model of constitutional transition that has been 
examined—and to varying degrees, adopted—by countries in later 
1 For a very helpful English-language overview of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, see 
VICTOR FERRERES COMELLA, THE CONSTITUTION OF SPAIN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
(2013). 
2 GREGORIO ALONSO & DIEGO MURO, Introduction to THE POLITICS AND MEMORY OF 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: THE SPANISH MODEL 1, (Gregorio Alonso & Diego Muro eds., 
Routledge, 2011). 
3 See generally Bonnie Field, Interparty Consensus and Intraparty Discipline in Spain’s 
Transition to Democracy, THE POLITICS AND MEMORY OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: THE 
SPANISH MODEL 71, (Gregorio Alonso & Diego Muro eds., Routledge, 2011). 
4 Joseph M. Colomer, Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way, 85 AMER. 
POL. SCI. REV. 1283, 1283 (1991). 
F 
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transitions. Indeed, its significance is seen in the influence the Spanish 
Model had on countries as varied as Poland, South Africa, and 
Ethiopia.5 
Today, Spain is a nation of forty-seven million people and is the 
world’s thirteenth-largest economy.6 Spain’s relatively recent return to 
democracy and, as a consequence, its membership in the European 
Union, the Council of Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), are of significant contemporary geopolitical 
importance. And, its historic lesson that dictatorship is possible even in 
relatively modern and developed Western nations remains a 
necessary—if frightening—reminder in our era of rightward-leaning 
Western governments.  
Nevertheless, Spain’s constitutional transition is less well known to 
most English-language scholars than it deserves. It is overshadowed in 
American scholarship by the historically contemporaneous French 
Revolution, undertheorized relative to the dual waves of national 
constitutionalism following the end of World War II and the Cold War, 
and undervalued due to the United States’ and British Commonwealth 
countries’ far closer connection to English common law and the British 
constitutional tradition.  
But, there is much fruitfully to study in Spanish constitutional 
history and in the nation’s transition to democracy. First, the Spanish 
legal legacy lives on throughout North and South America, even in the 
laws of the United States. North Americans often seem to forget that 
the Spanish Empire was the Americas’ largest colonial power. In 
addition to the obvious cultural, religious, and linguistic influences 
throughout Central and South America, Spanish territorial claims 
stretched from southern Alaska, across western Canada, and at their 
peak, claimed all the future United States west of the Mississippi River, 
in addition to Florida and much of the Caribbean.7 The legacy of 
5 See Luis López Guerra, The Application of the Spanish Model in the Constitutional 
Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1937, 1942 (1998); see 
also Charles E. Ehrlich, Ethnicity and Constitutional Reform: The Case of Ethiopia, 6 ILSA 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 51, 57 (1999).
6 Instituto Nacional de Estadística [Spanish National Statistics Database] reports a
January 1, 2018, population of 46.7 million persons, available at http://www.ine.es/dyngs/ 
INEbase/en/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736176951&menu=ultiDatos&idp
=1254735572981 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018); Spain’s 2017 Gross Domestic Product was 
$1,310 billion (in USD) according to the International Monetary Fund DataMapper, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/ 
WEOWORLD/ESP (World Economic Outlook; Apr. 2018). 
7 See generally DAVID WEBER, THE SPANISH FRONTIER IN NORTH AMERICA (Yale 
1994). 
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Spanish property law, water law, and family law is still evident in the 
laws of many states and provinces, especially in the western United 
States and the Caribbean.8 Additionally, the modern Spanish 
Constitution shares the same historical antecedent as many of the 
countries in the Americas: the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz.9 And finally, 
because of Spain’s unique history of dictatorship and monarchy for 
nearly all its history, the convoluted nature of its regional 
interrelationships, and the relative modernity of its text, the Spanish 
Constitution includes several highly unique—and uniquely 
significant—characteristics, even while being solidly within the 
Western tradition of democratic constitutionalism. 
This Article seeks to understand and evaluate core elements of the 
past promise and present reality of Spain’s transformation from 
Francoist dictatorship to modern European democracy. It does this by 
investigating the role of the 1978 Constitution and the distinctive 
Spanish Model of relatively peaceful constitutional transformation in 
facilitating the key legal elements of Spain’s transition to democracy. 
Following a review of important historical developments related to 
Spanish constitutionalism in Part I, this Article scrutinizes the process 
by which Spain transitioned to democracy in the 1970s. Part II focuses 
particularly on the dominant characteristics of the Spanish Model, 
which facilitated peaceful democratic transformation. Part III critically 
evaluates the use of the Spanish Model as a tool to decisively reject the 
core political elements of the Franco regime—autocratic rule, 
authoritarian governance, and fascism—and empower rights-based 
constitutional democracy. Finally, Part IV assesses the significance of 
the Spanish Model to the 1978 Constitution and the twenty-first century 
Kingdom of Spain and anticipates the Model’s potential for future 
global influence. 
8 See, e.g., Eric B. Kunkel, The Spanish Law of Waters in the United States: From 
Alfonso the Wise to the Present Day, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 341, 353–56 (2001) (discussing 
the legacy of Spanish water law and property law); Michael J. Vaughn, The Policy of 
Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 20–21 (1967) 
(discussing Spanish origins of community property regimes in the United States); McCoy 
v. United States, 247 F. 861, 867 (5th Cir. 1918) (Batts, J., concurring) (“[T]he territory
acquired from Mexico had for the groundwork of its jurisprudence the civil law as developed
in Spain and her colonies. When these lands were acquired, the mere act of acquisition did
not give to them a United States system of laws.”).
9 CONSTITUCIÓN DE CÁDIZ [Constitution of Cádiz] Mar. 19, 1812 (Spain), http://www. 
cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/c1812/12159396448091522976624/index.htm. 
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This Article argues that, despite recent, significant, and evolving 
challenges, constitutional democracy is strong in Spain and has been 
significantly aided by its constitutional text and the Spanish Model that 
inaugurated it. The Article concludes that, four decades later, there is 
much to study and learn from the way Spain successfully leveraged its 
constitutional process to overcome its authoritarian past and solidify its 
place as a stable modern democracy. 
I 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTICONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 
SPANISH HISTORY 
The story of modern Spain as a constitutional democracy is partially 
explicable as a divergent, sometimes painful attempt to maintain and 
define a Spanish national identity in the centuries of waning global 
influence following Spain’s Golden Age. The Siglo de Oro, Spain’s era 
of global empire, vast colonial wealth, and monarchic stability in the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, was established with the 
unification of Spain under the Catholic monarchs Isabella and 
Ferdinand.10 During this period, long before the era of global 
constitutionalism, the Kingdom of Spain grew from a few nominally 
united monarchies on the Iberian Peninsula to a worldwide empire 
spread across Europe, East Asia, and North and South America.11 
With the end of Habsburg rule in the late seventeenth century, 
Spanish global power waned significantly. Spain’s fiscal and political 
health became more closely linked to France, through ties to the House 
of Bourbon, then alliance with Revolutionary France, and eventually 
defeat by Napoleon.12 Reaction against Napoleonic reforms13 (and 
placement of Napoleon’s brother on the throne of Spain) eventually 
brought about the first modern Spanish constitution. 
Relative to many countries, Spain has not had a significant number 
of national constitutions. Compared with its neighbor France (16 
constitutions)14 or its colonial successor states in Latin America, for 
10 HENRY KAMEN, GOLDEN AGE SPAIN 5–22 (2nd ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2005). 
11 Id. at 23–39.  
12 HENRY KAMEN, PHILIP V OF SPAIN: THE KING WHO REIGNED TWICE 1–33 (2001). 
13 Edward J. Goodman, Spanish Nationalism in the Struggle Against Napoleon, 20 THE 
REV. POL. 337 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1958). 
14 Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REV. 1024 (1989). 
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example, the Dominican Republic (32) 15 or Venezuela (26),16 Spain’s 
history of only seven constitutions (and in practice, only three 
functional democratic constitutions) in the last 300 years is relatively 
modest.17 However, each of the three constitutions examined below 
have an important role: the Constitution of Cádiz had global influence, 
the liberal Constitution of 1931 prompted the Spanish Civil War, and 
the modern Constitution of 1978 restored democracy to Spain. 
A. The Constitution of Cádiz
Arguably Spain’s most significant historical constitution was the 
Constitution of 1812, typically called the Constitution of Cádiz, or 
more famously, La Pepa.18 It was formulated in a relatively traditional 
process, with the elected, and ostensibly national, assembly (Cortes) 
acting as a representative constituent assembly.19 Although much of the 
Spanish territory was occupied by Napoleon’s forces as part of the 
1807–14 Peninsular War, the Cádiz Cortes gathered representatives of 
the regions of Spain (or, where necessary, deputized others to represent 
occupied regions) to write a constitution in 1810.20 Although it was a 
legislature in exile, the Cortes claimed national sovereign authority to 
draft and promulgate their constitution. The Constitution of Cádiz was 
nominally in force from 1812–14, again from 1820–23 following a 
period in which King Ferdinand VII re-asserted absolute sovereignty, 
and finally from 1836–37 as an interim document for a new constitution 
in 1837.21 
The significance of the Constitution of Cádiz is based on three 
elements. First, it was a markedly liberal constitution for the era, hailed 
15 José Luis Cordeiro, CONSTITUTIONS AROUND THE WORLD: A VIEW FROM LATIN 
AMERICA 164 IDE Discussion Paper (Inst. of Dev. Econ. July 1, 2008), 
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/164.html.  
16 Id. 
17 Aniversario Constitución Española [Spanish Constitutional Anniversary] 1978–2003: 
Otras Constituciónes [Other Constitutions], EUROPA PRESS (2007), https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20071012233918/http://www.constitucion.es/otras_constituciones/espana/index.html. 
18 CESAR ARROYO LANDA, ROLE OF CONSTITUTION OF CÁDIZ IN THE GESTATION OF 
THE INDEPENDENCE OF PERU 330 (2012). 
19 Roger D. Congleton, Early Spanish Liberalism and Constitutional Political Economy: 
The Cádiz Constitution of 1812, CTR. FOR THE STUD. OF PUB. CHOICE 14–15 (2010), 
http://www.rdc1.org/forthcoming/Early_Spanish_Political_Economy_4.pdf. 
20 J.H. ELLIOTT, EMPIRES OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD: BRITAIN AND SPAIN IN AMERICA, 
1492–1830, 378 (Yale 2006). 
21 MATTHEW C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: THE CONSTITUTION OF 
CÁDIZ AND ITS LEGACY IN SPANISH AMERICA 41 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2015). 
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in the United States as “the most liberal, wise and durable . . . and even 
far superior to the boasted ones of many republican governments.”22 
Although it recognized the rule of King Ferdinand VII, it also gave 
significant authority to the Cortes Generales as a national legislature 
and included select freedoms and protections, that were broadly 
available to free male residents of Spain’s American and Asian 
colonies as well.23 Indeed, the constituent body gathered in Cádiz 
included representatives of Spanish America as well as Spain itself.24 
The Constitution included land reform and private property rights, 
freedom of the press, and representational legislation under the 
monarch.25 
Second, because of its timing, the Constitution of Cádiz had 
significant and direct impact upon the constitutions of the emerging, 
postcolonial nations of South America.26 The Constitution of Cádiz has 
been called “America’s other First Constitution” for its substantial and 
enduring influence over the later constitutions of the Americas.27 
Indeed, while in force it was the constitution of the Spanish Empire, 
including her colonies in America and Asia.28 The constitutions of 
Mexico, Peru, Cuba, and Ecuador still reflect this earliest source of 
constitutional principles.29 The Constitution of Cádiz functioned as a 
direct influence on later constitutions across Europe as well.30 
22 Scott Eastman & Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, THE RISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
GOVERNMENT IN THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC WORLD: THE IMPACT OF THE CÁDIZ 
CONSTITUTION OF 1812 2 (2015).  
23 CONSTITUCIÓN DE CÁDIZ [Constitution of Cádiz] Mar. 19, 1812 (Spain), 
http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/c1812/12159396448091522976624/in
dex.htm; Lorenzo Peña, Un puente jurídico entre Iberoamérica y Europa: La Constitución 
Española de 1812, in AMÉRICA Y EUROPA: IDENTIDADES, EXILIOS Y EXPECTATIVAS 95–
114 (J.M. González, ed., Madrid: Casa de América 2002). 
24 MIROW, supra note 21, at 7; see generally Marie Laure Rieu-Millan, Los diputados 
Americanos en las Cortes de Cádiz: Igualdad o Independencia (Madrid: Consejo Superior 
de Investigaciones Científicas 1990). 
25 CONSTITUCIÓN DE CÁDIZ [Constitution of Cádiz] Mar. 19, 1812 (Spain), 
http://cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/c1812/12159396448091522976624/index. 
htm. 
26 Scott Eastman & Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, eds., THE RISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
GOVERNMENT IN THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC WORLD: THE IMPACT OF THE CÁDIZ 
CONSTITUTION OF 1812 41–57 (Alabama 2015); see generally MIROW, supra note 21. 
27 See generally MIROW, supra note 21, at 31–73. 
28 CONSTITUCIÓN DE CÁDIZ [Constitution of Cádiz] Mar. 19, 1812 (Spain), tit. 1, ch. 2, 
art. 10, http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/c1812/12159396448091522 
976624/index.htm.  
29 MIROW, supra note 21, at 201–269. 
30 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 2. 
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Third, the Constitution of Cádiz represented the authoritative model 
of constitutional monarchy in Spanish history. Indeed, it structured a 
model of constitutionally and democratically limited monarchical 
authority that would, erratically and often painfully, animate significant 
controversies throughout Spanish history. 
B. The Constitution of 1931
Another particularly noteworthy and influential historical 
constitution31 was the Constitution of 1931. Although fated to a 
relatively short life, it was a notable liberal and progressive 
accomplishment. This Second Republic Constitution was a reformist 
document meant to modernize Spain and align it more closely with 
other European nations.32 As such, it included no role for the monarchy, 
increased regional autonomy, provided expansive powers for 
nationalization of industries, and included equality guarantees, 
individual liberties, rights protections, and universal male suffrage33—
and in 1933, the exercise of universal female suffrage as well.34 
The potential economic changes were significant for Spain, “the 
Western European nation closest to feudalism” at the time.35 Economic 
inequality was acute in early twentieth-century Spain, an agrarian 
country where sixty-five percent of the land was held by an extremely 
wealthy two percent of the population.36 Initially, the transition was a 
welcome sign for liberal democracy in contrast to the rise of fascism 
elsewhere on the continent. It was a hopeful sign for a peaceful return 
to constitutional democracy and lawfulness after decades of political 
violence and weakened rule of law in Spain.37 
31 After Constitution of Cádiz, Spain had four additional constitutions prior to the 
Second Republic’s Constitution of 1931. These Constitutions, each presenting models of 
constitutional monarchy, were enacted in 1837, 1845, 1869, and 1876. Spain produced 
written but unenacted constitutions in 1856 and 1873. See Otras Constituciónes, supra note 
17. 
32 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 3–5. 
33 CONSTITUTIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA ESPAÑOLA [CONSTITUTION OF THE SPANISH 
REPUBLIC] Dec. 9, 1931, tit. III, Derechos y Deberes de los Españoles [Rights and Duties 
of the Spanish People] (Spain). 
34 JUAN CARLOS OCANA AYBAR, THE 2ND REPUBLIC AND THE CIVIL WAR (1931–1936) 
(IES Parque de Lisboa), http://www.historiasiglo20.org/4ESO/Spain%20-Second%20 
Republic%20and%20SCW.pdf.  
35 ADAM HOCHSCHILD, SPAIN IN THEIR HEARTS 23 (2016). 
36 Id. at 24. 
37 Id. at 23. 
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The Constitution of 1931 also restructured the relationship between 
Spain and the Roman Catholic Church in starkly secularist terms, 
declaring that Spain’s Second Republic had “no official state 
religion.”38 It disentangled the Church from certain state institutions, 
providing for civil marriage, divorce, and secular education.39 The 
Constitution banned religious displays, traditional Catholic education, 
and even the Jesuits from Spain.40 
In the end, the era of progressive constitutional democracy was 
disappointing; this secular and liberal democratic period was confused, 
occasionally lawless, and short-lived.41 Traditionalists asserted that the 
Constitution of 1931 was socially destructive because of its progressive 
elements and its radical departure from existing Spanish social and 
political norms. Many described Franco’s Nationalist cause as a 
rebellion to the social upheaval caused by the liberalizing and 
progressive elements of the 1931 Constitution.42 Although the legacy 
of the Constitution of 1931 is evident in the text of the current Spanish 
Constitution, its most significant impact is the impetus it provided for 
the Spanish Civil War.43 
C. Anticonstitutionalism: The Civil War and Francoist Spain
The Spanish Civil War lasted nearly three horrific years beginning
in July 1936. It ended with the surrender of the last Republican forces, 
those supportive of the Second Republic as established by the 
Constitution of 1931, in April 1939.44 The leader of the Nationalist 
forces, General Francisco Franco, ruled Spain from then until his death 
in 1975.45 The Nationalists abolished the Constitution of 1931 and, as 
a consequence, Spain held no democratic elections between 1936 and 
1977.46  
38 CONSTITUTIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA ESPAÑOLA [Constitution of the Spanish Republic] 
Dec. 9, 1931, prel. tit., art. 3 (Spain). 
39 Jose Antonio Souto Paz, Perspectives on Religious Freedom in Spain, 2001 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 669, 680–85 (2001).
40 Id.
41 HOCHSCHILD, supra note 35, at 23.
42 PAUL PRESTON, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR: REACTION, REVOLUTION, AND REVENGE 
87–88 (WW. Norton & Co. 2006). 
43 Id. 
44 ANTHONY BEEVOR, THE WAR FOR SPAIN: THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 1935–39 
(Penguin 2006). 
45 See generally PAUL PRESTON, FRANCO (1995); STANLEY G. PAYNE & JESÚS 
PALACIOS, FRANCO: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (2014). 
46 Stanley Meisler, Spain’s New Democracy, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 (Oct. 1977). 
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At the time of the Spanish Civil War, Americans were passionately 
interested in Spain and the outcome of the war. The Civil War was the 
single most reported-upon topic in The New York Times during the war 
years.47 As Adam Hochschild notes in his much-lauded history of the 
2,800 American civilians who fought in the Spanish Civil War, 
published reports on the Spanish conflict outnumbered “any other 
single topic, including President Roosevelt, the rise of Nazi Germany, 
or the calamitous toll of the Great Depression.”48 
The stakes certainly seemed high for an ostensibly internal struggle. 
In part, this is because the responses of foreign nations seem so 
predictive of the early responses to World War II: lawless Nazi 
aggression, heedlessness among Spain’s democratic neighbors, and 
American isolation. It is difficult to imagine the eventual success of 
Franco’s Nationalist forces without the support of Hitler’s Germany 
and Mussolini’s Italy. Despite the pretense of a multilateral Non-
Intervention Agreement, the Axis powers provided troops (in the form 
of thinly-veiled “volunteers”), fuel, weapons, and international 
propaganda support.49 
Obviously, the Civil War itself is outside the scope of this Article; 
however, there are a few characteristics of the struggle and its 
consequences that affect Spanish constitutional history. The most 
obvious point is that a victory by the Republicans would have left the 
starkly democratic, secular, and progressive Constitution of 1931 in 
force. Instead, it governed Spain for only a few years and then 
languished during the Civil War, only in effect in the areas 
unconquered by Franco’s Nationalists.50 Some elements of the 
progressive 1931 Constitution would return, but not for nearly fifty 
years. 
Moreover, following Franco’s victory in the Spanish Civil War, 
political dominance at the national level was complemented by active 
political oppression at the regional level. Franco suppressed any 
independent ethno-cultural identity for the historic regions of Spain, 
with repression felt most acutely in the historically defined and 
independence minded regions like the Basque Country and Catalonia.51 
47 HOCHSCHILD, supra note 35, at xvi. 
48 Id. 
49 BEEVOR, supra note 44, at ch. 13. 
50 Of course, Franco’s Nationalists created and enforced a wholly different constitutional 
system in the territories they controlled. PRESTON, supra note 42, at 316–17. 
51 Id. 
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Francoist policies suppressed local language, traditions, and culture, 
even the limited regional autonomy of the 1931 Constitution was 
rejected.52 This policy, of course, exacerbated long-standing conflicts 
between the national government and the regions—the consequences 
of which are still dramatically evident today.53  
Empowerment, rather than repression, typified the relationship 
between the Franco regime and Spain’s more conservative institutions, 
such as the Roman Catholic Church, the military, and the monarchy. 
All three institutions benefited significantly from Franco’s victory, not 
only because they had held diminished power under the Constitution of 
1931 but because they enjoyed the state’s favor throughout the Franco 
era.54 The relationship was certainly not one-sided; the military had 
predominately sided with Franco to overthrow the Republic. The 
Roman Catholic Church and Franco were closely allied throughout the 
Civil War and the early years of Franco’s rule: “The ‘triumphant’ 
church born in the Civil War was made possible by the Franco regime, 
but one could also say that the regime in large part was made possible, 
stable, and long lasting thanks to the religious legitimation.”55 Franco’s 
Spain was a “political monolith . . . supported by two pillars”: the 
military and the church.56 Both institutions supported Franco as a 
lifeline to pre-1931 influence. However, the closeness of these 
relationships would affect the role of both institutions in the 
constitutional framework that followed Franco’s death. 
The Republican Constitution of 1931 terminated the formal power 
of the monarchy, just as it had with the church.57 This is why the 
monarchists joined Franco’s military coup. Their reward was the 
eventual return of the monarchy when Franco declared that Juan 
Carlos, grandson of the last ruling Spanish king Alfonso XIII, would 
be his heir as head of state. Franco made this possible with passage of 
52 BEEVOR, supra note 44, at 340–42, 407–09. 
53 See, e.g., Michael Birnbaum, For Some, Catalonia Crackdown Evokes Memories of 
the Dark Days of Spain’s Dictatorship, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/world/europe/spanish-crackdown-on-catalonia-independence-effort-
prompts-bitter-memories-of-franco-ictatorship/2017/11/08/b0ae6eac-bf14-11e7-9294-
705f80164f6e_story.html?utm_term=.1ef9f90abf0e. 
54 Paz, supra note 39, at 685–87. 
55 Juan J. Linz, Church and State in Spain from the Civil War to the Return of 
Democracy, 120 DEADALUS 159, 163 (1991). 
56 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 11. 
57 Id. 
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a ley fundamental in 194758 and a 1969 declaration that Juan Carlos 
would be the future king of Spain—although Franco remained head of 
state for life.59 The supportive role of Juan Carlos I in the transition to 
democracy removed the taint of association with Franco and secured a 
role for the monarchy, albeit a diminished one, in the post-Franco 
constitutional scheme. 
With Franco’s victory in the Civil War, Spain entered a long period 
without a constitution.60 The Spain of Franco’s four decades possessed 
no unitary governing document crafted through constituent power. The 
modest exception to this was the Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom 
(Las Leyes Fundamentales del Reino), seven quasi-constitutional laws 
that declared parameters for the running of Francoist Spain.61 After 
1945, there was the possibility of passage of fundamental laws with 
theoretically higher-order legal force if Franco approved.62 The third of 
these laws, the national referendum law (Ley del Referéndum 
Nacional), allowed minimal head-of-household voting for such laws of 
quasi-constitutional significance, but this power was exercised only 
twice: to allow future restoration of the monarchy in 194763 and to 
reorganize government power in 1967.64 
The Fuero de los Españoles, another ley fundamental, ostensibly 
identified the rights of Spaniards. But these “rights” were functionally 
unenforceable in the courts of the regime-dependent judiciary.65 The 
primary purpose of the Fuero de los Españoles was “window dressing 
originally intended to hoodwink the victorious [A]llies into a belief that 
58 LEY DE SUCESIÓN EN LA JEFATURA DEL ESTADO [Law of Succession of Head of 
State], (July 6, 1947), http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1947/160/A03272-03273.pdf. 
59 Walther Bernecker, Monarchy and Democracy: The Political Role of King Juan 
Carlos in the Spanish Transición, 33 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 65 (1998). 
60 See generally The Franco Years, in SPAIN: A COUNTRY STUDY (Eric Solsten & 
Sandra W. Meditz, 1988), http://countrystudies.us/spain/22.htm.  
61 See id. at ch. 1. 
62 LEY DEL REFERENDUM NACIONAL [Law of National Referendum], (Oct. 24, 1945), 
http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1945/297/A02522-02522.pdf. 
63 LEY DE SUCESIÓN EN LA JEFETURA DEL ESTADO [Law on the Succession of the Head 
of State], (1947), http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1947/160/A03272-03273.pdf. In the 
July 6 referendum, support was claimed to be 95.1 percent of voters. See D. NOHLEN & P. 
STÖVER, ELECTIONS IN EUROPE: A DATA HANDBOOK 1823 (2010). 
64 LEY ORGÁNICA DEL ESTADO [Organic Law of State], (Jan. 10, 1967), 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1967/01/11/pdfs/A00466-00477.pdf. 
65 José J. Toharia, Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of 
Contemporary Spain, 9 LAW & SOC. REV. 475, 486–96 (1975); Carl Pinkele, Plus ca 
Change: The Interaction Between the Legal System and Political Change in Francoist 
Spain, 13 INT’L. POL. SCI. REV. 285 (1992).  
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Spain was a liberal state.”66 Similarly, the right to vote was of little 
practical import because of the starkly circumscribed power of the 
legislature. Families and groups, rather than individuals, were given the 
very limited right to vote and the government was in no way regulated 
by the determinations of the Cortes.67 The necessary rights to free 
speech, free press, and political association were unknown.68 
Unsurprisingly, the regime lacked an independent judiciary during this 
era as well. In the Franco era, courts had restricted authority and 
minimal independence.69 
The nature of authoritarian governance is the substitution of the 
wishes of a single ruler for actual rule of law. In a 1962 report, the 
International Commission of Jurists concluded that Franco’s regime 
was based on “the intolerance and subjugation of all opposition which 
characterize a totalitarian system.”70 Throughout this period, Franco 
was “Caudillo,” a strongman holding military and political power; 71 
the Spanish version of Nazi Germany’s “Führer” or Fascist Italy’s 
“Duce.” This made him formally the head of state for Spain. He also 
functioned as prime minister, which made him the head of Spain’s 
legislature and one-party government as well.72 Franco also retained his 
title of Generalissimo, supreme leader of the Spanish military.73 
Finally, after the 1947 quasi referendum to appease monarchists in 
Franco’s conservative coalition, Franco became regent for life for the 
to-be-restored monarchy.74  
Similarly, rather than having a constitution, Spain had only what one 
historian called “the constitutional cosmetics of authoritarianism.”75 
This makes perfect sense for an authoritarian dictatorship. If the 
purpose of constitutionalism is to subject government power to 
reasoned limitations in order to advance shared values and protect 
66 RAYMUND CARR & JUAN PABLO FUSI, SPAIN: DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 45 
(2nd ed. 1981). 
67 Id. at 43. 
68 Id. at 45–46. 
69 Toharia, supra note 65, at 486–96. 
70 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, SPAIN AND THE RULE OF LAW 82–88 (1962), 
https://archive.org/stream/spainruleoflaw00inte/spainruleoflaw00inte_djvu.txt. 
71 PAUL PRESTON, THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN 1–5 (1986).  
72 STANLEY G. PAYNE, FASCISM IN SPAIN 1923–1977 239–42 (1999). See id.  
73 LAURA DESFOR EDLES, SYMBOL AND RITUAL IN THE NEW SPAIN: THE TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY AFTER FRANCO 36 (Jeffrey C. Alexander & Steven Seidman eds., 1998). 
74 PAYNE, supra note 72, at 401. 
75 CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 40. 
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rights under the rule of law, a constitution is antithetical to 
authoritarianism. 
The overarching political model of the Franco era was one of 
significant but not classic authoritarianism organized along quasi-
fascist models of citizen control. Commentators have noted that it is 
difficult to precisely place Franco’s Spain in a typology of political 
science. As the Francoists insisted, “Spain is different.”76 This is 
unsurprising since the defining characteristics of a particular autocracy 
track the individual ruler with his own quirks and perspective. 
Necessarily, a long-enduring state organized around such an 
idiosyncratic cult will bear the unique characteristics of that individual. 
As one commentator said of Franco in the 1960s, “[H]e does not make 
politics, he is politics.”77 
Over the decades, Francoism evolved. The unchallenged autocratic 
rule of Franco in 1940 finally had to accommodate the looming 
question of the 1970s: “After Franco, what?”78 This was in part 
accomplished through the pseudoconstitutional ley fundamental 
process, culminating in the Organic Law of 1967.79 The final ley 
fundamental was part of a strategy to address the issue of post-Franco 
Spain; it attempted to institutionalize the characteristics of the Francoist 
state institutions. However, this “constitution” was crafted without 
democratic legitimacy and existed in the absence of the rule of law; it 
could claim little legitimacy and placed no real limits on the actions of 
Franco’s government.  
D. Transitioning to the Transformation
Franco’s poor succession choices and the democratic commitments 
of Franco’s legally identified heir allowed Spain to transition to 
democracy. According to an earlier determination, Juan Carlos I 
assumed the throne as King of Spain upon the death of Franco on 
November 22, 1975, and became head of state.80 Franco had chosen 
76 Id. at 49. 
77 Id. at 1.  
78 Id. at 40–41.  
79 LEY ORGÁNICA DEL ESTADO [Organic Law of State], (Jan. 10, 1967), 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1967/01/11/pdfs/A00466-00477.pdf. 
80 MICHAEL T. NEWTON WITH PETER J. DONAGHY, INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN SPAIN: 
A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GUIDE 31 (1997). 
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Juan Carlos over his potentially more liberal father to ensure the 
maintenance of a Spanish nation along the Francoist model.81 
Initially, Carlos Arias Navarro, and then, within months, Adolfo 
Suárez held the position of prime minister for the still undemocratic 
Cortes under the authority of the King.82 Both were recognized as 
committed supporters of Franco. However, where the exceedingly 
modest democratic reforms of Arias Navarro had failed, the more 
robust changes of Suárez were successful. They allowed for Spain’s 
democratic elections in 1976, the first since 1931, and altered the 
political and legal framework to allow for such democratic 
developments.83 
The election, although weighted in favor of the more conservative 
views, allowed participation by all political parties. This fulfilled a 
promise the King had made when he addressed the U.S. Congress in 
June 1976, where he promised to “ensure, under the principles of 
democracy . . . the orderly access to power of distinct political 
alternatives, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the 
people.”84 The consequence of the election was a broadly 
representative Cortes poised to reshape the Spanish political landscape 
through a constitution that sharply rejected the political forms and 
values of the Franco era. 
The promised elections were held in 1977. A contemporary reporter 
described the scenes that Franco would have abhorred:  
Communists brazenly waving red banners, chanting slogans, and 
singing the Internationale; the young, dynamic leader of the Socialist 
Workers Party entering rallies with his left hand in a clenched fist 
salute, his right signaling V for victoria; politicians exhorting 
Basques in Euskera, Catalans in Catalan, Galicians in Gallego, all 
forbidden languages a few years before; and newspapers belittling 
their government and its leader.85 
81 EDLES, supra note 73, at 37. 
82 Id. 
83 See LEY 1/1977, DE 4 DE ENERO, PARA LA REFORMA POLITICA [Law of Political 
Reform], (Jan. 5, 1977), http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1977/01/05/pdfs/A00170-00171.pdf. 
84 Meisler, supra note 46, at 56; see generally A King for Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, June 
4, 1976, at A24. 
85 Meisler, supra note 46. 
2018] Forty Years from Fascism: Democratic Constitutionalism 17 
 and the Spanish Model of National Transformation 
II 
A MODERN SPANISH CONSTITUTION IN THE EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL 
Spaniards commonly refer to the period between Franco’s death and 
the inauguration of the new Constitution as La Transición.86 But, from 
most perspectives, Spain’s second twentieth-century transition is more 
accurately described as a transformation. With Franco’s death, the 
nation lost its thirty-five-year commander in chief, prime minister, and 
head of state. In its short transition period, the nation would also discard 
its quasi-constitutional Fundamental Laws and draft and ratify a 
radically new constitution. From November 1975 to December 1978, 
Spain would transform from an internationally disfavored Francoist 
autocracy to a modern European constitutional democracy with an eye 
on membership in the Council of Europe, the European Communities,87 
and NATO.88 
If “transformation” describes the quality of the change, the actual 
process by which the transition occurred has acquired a different 
moniker among scholars: the Spanish Model.89 As discussed in more 
depth below, the Spanish Model is shorthand for a relatively peaceful 
constitutional transition typified by legal continuity with the prior 
regime, an elites-driven process of negotiation, and broad popular 
consensus that avoids extreme results. This model was eagerly studied 
86 Some commentators extend this transitional period to the failed 1981 coup d’état or 
to the 1982 elections that peacefully transitioned to an elected socialist government. PILAR 
ORTUÑO ANAYA, LOS SOCIALISTAS EUROPEOS Y LA TRANSICIÓN ESPAÑOLA (1959–1977) 
[EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS AND THE SPANISH TRANSITION (1959–1977)] 22 (Marcial Pons. 
2005) (“Con respecto al final del proceso de la transición española, existen diferencias de 
opinión entre los especialistas de este periodo.” [With regard to the end of the Spanish 
transitional process, there are differences of opinion among specialists of this era.]). 
87 Étienne Deschamps, The Accession of Spain and Portugal, CENTRE VIRTUEL DE LA 
CONNAISSANCE DE L’EUROPE, http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the_accession_of_spain_and_ 
portugal-en-b1dd040b-7463-4e67-88f2-4890f5b8fac6.html (last updated Aug. 7, 2016). In 
1977 when Spain applied, and in 1986 when Spain acceded to the treaties, it was not yet 
referred to as the European Union. Spain acceded to the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic 
Community, the E.U.’s predecessor entities with merged administration under the Treaty of 
Brussels (1965). Timeline: History of the European Union, THE TELEGRAPH [UK] (Sept. 
14, 2009), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/6181087/Timeline-
history-of-the-European-Union.html. 
88 Francisco José Rodrigo Luelmo, The Accession of Spain to NATO, CENTRE VIRTUEL 
DE LA CONNAISSANCE DE L’EUROPE, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2010/4/28/ 
831ba342-0a7c-4ead-b35f-80fd52b01de9/publishable_en.pdf (last updated Aug. 7, 2016).  
89 ALONSO & MURO, supra note 2. 
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and loosely followed by countries in later, analogous transitions. This 
Part examines the mechanisms, the model, and the meaning of Spain’s 
post-authoritarianism transformation. 
A. Drafting a Modern Spanish Constitution
Upon the long anticipated death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco 
on November 20, 1975, Spain entered an uncertain era of transition. 
Franco had determined and enforced the form, tenor, and actual rulers 
of the prior thirty-five years. Even in the waning years of his 
dictatorship, Spain was Franco’s. Moreover, while the rest of Western 
Europe90 had inaugurated a post-War process of closer economic 
integration (through the European Communities), mutual defense 
(through NATO), and promotion of human rights (through the Council 
of Europe), Spain had been relegated to the sidelines during these 
international developments. 
1. Earliest Steps Toward Constitutional Democracy
As arranged by Franco prior to his death, the Cortes Generales, the
appointed Francoist pseudo-Parliament, proclaimed Juan Carlos I to be 
King of Spain.91 This could have been a calamitous beginning for a 
constitutional transition because Juan Carlos was the grandson of 
Alfonso XIII, the king deposed by the Constitution of 1931.92 
Moreover, Juan Carlos was Franco’s anointed and groomed successor, 
and Juan Carlos had even stepped in as acting head of state during the 
protracted illnesses near the end of Franco’s life.93 He had expressly 
affirmed his commitment to the Franco regime’s laws prior to his 
coronation.94 
However, the priorities of the newly restored king were not those of 
the prior regime. Although there was no abrupt rupture with the 
Francoist state or dismantling of Francoist state institutions, Juan 
Carlos I took steps to advance the transition away from 
authoritarianism. As king, Juan Carlos supported democracy in 
90 The notable exception is Portugal, which also transitioned from autocratic rule on a 
similar, but slightly earlier, timeline. Following the Carnation Revolution, Portugal held 
democratic elections in 1974 and ratified its democratic constitution in 1976. DOUGLAS L. 
WHEELER & WALTER C. OPELLO JR., HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF PORTUGAL xxviii (3d 
ed. 2010).  
91 Bernecker, supra note 59, at 70. 
92 EDLES, supra note 73, at 29. 
93 See generally Bernecker, supra note 59. 
94 CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 208. 
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unexpected ways. Importantly, he appointed Adolfo Suárez, a 
Francoist insider who soon revealed his commitment to reform, as 
prime minister.95 Working within the existing Francoist institutions, the 
appointed prime minister proposed substantial political and democratic 
reforms. Suárez would go on to become the first democratically elected 
Prime Minister of Spain in the 1977 elections—the first genuine 
election since 1931.96 
The transition to parliamentary democracy preceded the drafting and 
ratification of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain. The Law of 
Political Reform (Ley para la Reforma Politica), proposed in 1976, 
signaled the commitment to a peaceful transition without a radical 
rupture of the existing legal framework.97 Passed by the undemocratic 
Cortes and overwhelmingly affirmed in a popular referendum,98 the 
law paved the way for the return and promotion of political and social 
groups persecuted by Franco.99 The resulting elections gave a plurality 
to the United Democratic Centre Party (Unión de Centro Democrático) 
of Suárez (with 34.3 percent of the vote) but also showed significant 
political support for the center-left Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español), which received 28.5 percent of 
the vote.100 But the election was only the first step in a long process of 
transformation for Spain. The newly elected and newly representative 
Cortes was “a democratic institution in the middle of a sea of dictatorial 
power structures.”101 A new constitution would be necessary to 
transform Spain. 
2. Constitutional Drafting Process
It was in this period of optimism, following the first democratic
elections since the Civil War, that the constitutional drafting process 
95 Suárez was briefly preceded by Arias Navarro, the King’s initial appointment as prime 
minister. EDLES, supra note 73, at 37. 
96 Charles Powell, Revisiting Spain’s Transition to Democracy, IEMED 39, 46–47 
(2016). 
97 See generally LEY 1/1977, DE 4 DE ENERO, PARA LA REFORMA POLITICA [Law of 
Political Reform], (Jan. 5, 1977), http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1977/01/05/pdfs/A00170-
00171.pdf.  
98 Congress of the Deputies, Referéndum sobre el Proyecto de Ley para la Reforma 
Política [Referendum on the Project of the Law for Political Reform] (voting results), at 
http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/referendos/ref_r_p.htm; EDLES, supra note 73, at 
11. 
99 CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 218. 
100 PRESTON, supra note 71, at 119.  
101 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 12.  
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began in earnest.102 Although Spaniards had overwhelmingly supported 
more centrist political parties in the 1977 elections,103 tensions 
remained. Suárez navigated tense relations with a military accustomed 
to significant governmental influence, elements of the independence 
minded Basque region that employed terrorist violence, and 
emboldened opposition political parties.104 In an era of increased 
unemployment and economic stagnation, the possibility of further 
violence, unrecoverable political fracture, or the collapse of popular 
support for reforms was significant.105  
Hence, the initial optimism, the savvy—if occasionally 
unprincipled—leadership by Suárez, and the general mood of 
consensus for nation building allowed the drafting of the constitution 
to begin.106 De facto cooperation and the dominant spirit of consensus 
among the centrist political parties facilitated the process of 
constitutional drafting. Moreover, and vitally, the 1977 Moncloa Pact, 
a temporary truce regarding economic policies agreed on by political 
parties on the left and the right, minimized the threat of political 
disruption arising from economic protests—at least for the period of 
the constitutional transition.107 
The elected deputies of the Cortes formed a Committee for 
Constitutional Affairs and Public Liberties to draft the new 
constitution. The Committee consisted of thirty-six Parliament 
members in proportion to their party’s representation in Congreso, the 
larger house of the Cortes.108 The primary driver of success, however, 
was achieved through the appointment of a seven-member drafting 
subcommittee of high-level representatives of the primary political 
parties. 
Surprisingly, “the seven carried out their labours in a spirit of 
compromise and cooperation.”109 They had such success that they 
offered a first constitutional draft after just three months, in November 
1977. This success in finding agreeable compromises contributed to the 
102 PRESTON, supra note 71, at 122–23. 
103 EDLES, supra note 73, at 65–67. 
104 See PRESTON, supra note 71, at ch. 5. 
105 Thomas D. Lancaster, Economics, Democracy, and Spanish Elections, in ECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS AND ELECTORAL OUTCOMES: THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 
110, 117 (Heinz Eulau & Michael S. Lewis-Beck eds., 1985). 
106 See PRESTON, supra note 71, at ch. 5. 
107 Lancaster, supra note 105, at 117.
108 NEWTON, supra note 80, at 15. 
109 See PRESTON, supra note 71, at ch. 5. 
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sub-committee’s nickname as the “Consensus Committee.”110 The 
ultimate success of the authors resulted in their more enduring 
nickname: “los padres de la Constitution.”111 
A more developed first draft was reviewed by the Cortes in January 
1978, considered by constitutional committees of both houses 
(Congreso and Senado), and then returned to the seven-member 
subcommittee of the Constitutional Affairs Committee so it could 
consider more than 1300 possible amendments to the draft.112 The next 
round of the drafting process evidenced sharper differences with 
tensions on a variety of topics, including education, the role of the 
Roman Catholic Church, and regional autonomy. Despite difficulties, 
the seven drafters returned a signed second draft to the Constitutional 
Affairs Committee in mid-April 1978.113 After 1342 speeches over the 
course of 148 hours of debate, the Committee of Constitutional Affairs 
submitted the finalized draft to the Congreso.114 After passage in the 
Congreso, a slightly altered version was passed by the Senado.115 A 
reconciled version of the differing drafts resulted in a final amended 
proposal that was passed by an overwhelmingly positive vote of both 
bodies on October 31, 1978.116 On a vote with 11 “no” votes and a 
commanding 551 “yes” votes (with just 22 abstentions), the 
constitutional draft was submitted to the people for ratification.117 On 
December 6, 1978, in an expected but decisive victory, 87.8 percent of 
the 15.8 million voters supported the constitution.118 More remarkably, 
only 7.8 percent of voters nationwide opposed the constitution.119 In a 
final step, the constitution came into force on December 29, 1978, one 
day after it was signed by the King.120 
110 EDLES, supra note 73, at 102.  
111 See, e.g., FERRERES, supra note 1, at 12.  
112 EDLES, supra note 73, at 102. 
113 Id. at 102–04. 
114 Id. at 103–04. 
115 PRESTON, supra note 71, at 139.  
116 The vote in Congreso: yes 326; no 6; abstain 14. The vote in the Senado: yes 226; no 
5; abstain 8. NEWTON, supra note 80, at 17. 
117 Id. 
118 Although overall turnout was somewhat negatively affected by low turnout in the 
Basque region, nearly 68 percent of Spaniards voted in the ratification plebiscite. EDLES, 
supra note 73, at 104. 
119 Id. at 104–05. Significant abstentions in the independence-minded regions explain 
the differing numbers; 51.5 percent abstained in Galicia, 51.7 percent in the Basque region, 
and 31.7 percent in Catalonia. See also PRESTON, supra note 71, at 150. 
120 EDLES, supra note 73, at 104; George E. Glos, The New Spanish Constitution 
Comments and Full Text, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47 (1979). 
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3. Influences on the Drafting Process
The particular outcomes of the consensus process were heavily
molded by three influences: the external environment, especially the 
existence of relatively mature regional and international organizations; 
the timing of the constitutional process in the 1970s; and the 
overarching goal of post-Franco transformation. First, the appeal of 
membership in the post-War European institutions and Western 
alliances shaped certain elements of the new constitution.  
Second, the relatively exceptional timing of the Spanish 
constitutional drafting process—in the period well after World War II 
and the establishment of the post-War human right consensus but 
before the end of the Cold War—influenced the content and protection 
of civil and political rights as well as the inclusion of weaker provisions 
related to workers and social welfare rights.  
Third, popular reaction against the repressive, authoritarian, and 
anti-democratic characteristics of the Franco regime inclined the 
process toward significant structural and values-based changes. All 
three elements encouraged rights-based, democratic constitutionalism 
and significant socio-political transformation.  
a. Influence from the External Geopolitical Environment
Franco’s Spain was generally excluded from the European post-War
movement towards cooperative international organizations, 
consolidation of democratic and rights-based norms, and closer 
economic integration. Integration with the global community was such 
an important goal of the transitional and early constitutional periods 
that it is impossible to fully comprehend the modern legal framework 
under which the Spanish people live without some discussion of the 
legal milieu within which the modern Spanish state functions: the 
European Union, the Council of Europe, NATO, and the United 
Nations, as well as other international bodies related to trade, political 
and social integration, and human rights.  
Spain’s lack of genuine democratic institutions and failure to protect 
human rights precluded it from membership in the European 
Communities (now the European Union) and the Council of Europe 
during the Franco era.121 For the same reasons, Spain was not yet a 
member of the United Nations when the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by that body, and Spain did not 
become a signatory of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
121 PRESTON, supra note 71, at 60. 
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Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights until after Franco’s death.122  
Spain’s outsider status faded over the decades following the Spanish 
Civil War and World War II because of changes in global politics and 
evolution in the Franco regime’s domestic policies. Indeed, the text of 
the 1978 Constitution demonstrates clear evidence of the desire for 
Spain to, in the words of another nation’s transformative constitution, 
“take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.”123 
Spain had not been kept out of all international organizations. It was 
permitted to join the United Nations in 1955.124 This occurred in spite 
of suspicion toward Franco’s multiple opportunistic shifts in 
alliances—more accurately, his swing in de facto support despite 
assurances of neutrality—during World War II.125 Indeed, despite 
formal censure from the United Nations in 1946, within a decade 
Spain’s strategic importance in the burgeoning Cold War led to full 
membership in the United Nations.126 In a similarly pragmatic 
evolution of policy, the United States, which had excluded Spain from 
the Marshall Plan in the mid-1940s, normalized relations with Franco, 
expressly aligned with Spain for purposes of defense, and provided 
substantial financial support a decade later.127  
The Constitution allowed for, and expected, international 
arrangements at the time it was written and ratified. The first article of 
the Bill of Rights (Chapter One, “Fundamental Rights and Duties”) 
presumes Spain’s membership in international human rights 
organizations.128 Today, Spain is a signatory of a broad array of 
international agreements including the UDHR (1955), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1977) and its 
122 United Nations, “Status of Treaties,” TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND, https:// 
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4& 
clang=_en.  
123 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, Feb. 4, 1997, pmbl. 
124 EDLES, supra note 73, at 32.  
125 Foreign Policy Under Franco, in SPAIN: A COUNTRY STUDY (Eric Solsten & Sandra 
W. Meditz, eds., 1988), http://countrystudies.us/spain/24.htm.
126 EDLES, supra note 73, at 32.
127 Solsten & Meditz, supra note 125, at ch. 24.
128 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, art. 10 (“The
principles relating to the fundamental rights and liberties recognised by the Constitution 
shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
international treaties and agreements thereon ratified by Spain.”). 
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individual complaints mechanism (1984),129 the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1977) and its 
individual complaints protocol (2010), and many others. 130  
Spain’s eagerness to join the framework of European human rights 
institutions is evident in the rapidity with which it signed human rights 
treaties and joined human rights bodies following Franco’s death. 
Undoubtedly, this reflects a complementary interest by those bodies to 
welcome Spain into their existing networks as well. Spain joined the 
Council of Europe, became a signatory of the European Convention on 
Human Rights,131 and became subject to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights more than a year before its new 
Constitution came into force.132 It ratified the Council of Europe’s 
European Social Charter in May 1980 and every amendment and 
additional protocol to the Charter.133 In fact, Spain is a signatory of 
seventeen of the eighteen most prominent international human rights 
treaties administered by the United Nations.134 
But Spain did not join only human rights bodies. It was a clear goal 
of the newly democratic Spain to become a member of the European 
Community, the historical predecessor of today’s European Union. 
Membership had been denied in 1962 because Spain was not a 
129 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION (Jan. 7, 2018), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume% 
20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf. 
130 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION (Jan. 2, 2017), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/ 
Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-3-a.en.pdf; Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION (Dec. 10, 2008), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3a&chapter=4&clang=_en.  
131 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Apr. 11, 1950), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=ZIAcTejb.  
132 Spain became a signatory on November 24, 1977. Member States: Spain, COUNCIL 
OF EUROPE, http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/spain.  
133 Spain and the European Social Charter, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://rm.coe.int/ 
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016804
92969. 
134 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Status of 
Ratification Interactive Dashboard, “Spain,” http://indicators.ohchr.org (This interactive 
web tool allows the user to search based on any of the eighteen treaties and their optional 
protocols or based on country. Spain is currently not a signatory of the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families: 2003). 
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democracy.135 Following its evolution into a constitutional democracy, 
Spain’s challenge—similar to that of Greece and Portugal—was to 
comply with certain economic markers determined by the nine existing 
member states.136 Spain (along with Portugal) acceded to the European 
Community treaties in 1986.137  
Of course, the nature of the legal obligations and practical benefits 
derived from such membership has changed over time as the legal 
framework of the European Community has evolved into the European 
Union. The full legal impact of E.U. membership is outside the scope 
of this Article, but it does in fact extend back to the founding of the 
modern Spanish democratic state. Chapter II, Section 93 anticipated 
Spanish membership in the European Community (E.C.) and other 
international bodies in which it was denied membership during the 
Franco dictatorship:  
By means of an organic law, authorisation may be granted for 
concluding treaties by which powers derived from the Constitution 
shall be vested in an international organisation or institution. It is 
incumbent on the Cortes Generales or the Government, as the case 
may be, to guarantee compliance with these treaties and with the 
resolutions emanating from the international and supranational 
organisations in which the powers have been vested.138 
Other provisions in the Constitution seem similarly designed to equip the 
state to qualify for membership in the E.C. and other bodies.139 
There was far less popular or political support domestically for 
Spain’s membership in NATO, which it joined in 1982.140 Spain’s 
position at the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea offered NATO a 
critical location for military bases and maneuvers.141 Further, it was 
hoped that NATO membership (and reinforcement of links to the West) 
would encourage democratic developments in newly democratic Spain. 
135 Ronald Janse, The Evolution of the Political Criteria for Accession to the European 
Community, 1957–1973, 24 EUR. L.J. 57, 64–70 (2018). 
136 Sebastian Royo & Paul Christopher Manuel, Some Lessons from the Fifteenth 
Anniversary of the Accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Union, 8 S. EURO. SOC 
& POL. 1, 11–15 (2003). 
137 Id. at 1. 
138 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. III, ch. 2, art. 
93.  
139 Id. at pt. VII, art. 135, § 3. “The volume of public debt for all the Public 
Administrations as a whole as a ratio of the State’s Gross Domestic Product shall not surpass 
the benchmark figure set forth in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”  
140 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 11.  
141 Solsten & Meditz, supra note 125, at ch. 24. 
26 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 20, 1 
But, the United States’ long support for Franco rankled many parties 
and leaders on the left, and there was doubt about the claimed benefits 
for Spain.142  
Spain rapidly overcame its geopolitical isolation and advanced 
European integration within a few years of Franco’s death. These 
developments both preceded and were further facilitated by the 
Constitution’s anticipation of these international connections. 
Additionally, Spain’s popular desire for and constitutional 
accommodation of membership in established regional and 
international organizations was influenced by both the timing of 
Spain’s transition and the desire for transformation in the constitutional 
process.  
b. The Timing of the Transition
Many of the most notable characteristics of Spanish constitutional
law derive from the timing of the drafting of the Constitution. The 
distinctiveness is evidenced in both structural and rights-oriented 
textual provisions. As a consequence, three timing-related factors 
significantly affected the Spanish Constitution: the capacity to study 
maturing (and respected) postwar constitutions, the prominence of 
international and regional human rights documents, and the relative 
success of two decades of European integration. These established 
elements of post-War European democracy exerted an irresistible 
gravitational pull on Spain’s constitutional transition. 
Spain drafted its Constitution in a relatively quiet era of 
constitutional development. Although the entirety of the second-half of 
the twentieth-century witnessed a significant number of new 
constitutions each year, the late 1970s had nothing like the post–World 
War II and postcolonialism abundance of constitution drafting.143 
Equally, Spain’s transition preceded the wave of the late century 
constitution drafting at the end of the Cold War. 
Greece and Portugal were crafting post-dictatorship constitutions on 
nearly the same timeline as Spain: Greece completed its post-junta 
constitution in June 1975, and Portugal’s Carnation Revolution 
142 Id. The important decision lacked the hallmark transition-era consensus when UCD 
initiated a successful majority vote in the Spanish Cortes in December 1981. Seth King, 
Spain Enters NATO as First Country to Join Since 1955, N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (May 31, 1982). 
143 ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2009), http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/chronology/ (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2018).  
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resulted in a new constitution in April 1976.144 Otherwise, a major 
European country had not had a new constitution since France’s de 
Gaulle-motivated 1958 constitution.145 Indeed, in Western Europe 
today, only Switzerland and Finland have newer constitutions than 
Spain, both established in 1999.146 The drafting of a Spanish 
constitution three decades after World War II meant that it was crafted 
after the post-War constitutions had been established and functioned in 
practice. The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland) had come into force in 1949.147 The Basic Law is 
routinely viewed as one of the most influential constitutions in the 
world and it is certainly the most influential modern constitution.148 
Like the German Basic Law, the Spanish Constitution created a strong 
constitutional court as a check on unlawful uses of state power.149 The 
description of the German Constitutional Court as “a strict but 
benevolent guardian of an immature democracy that cannot quite trust 
itself”150 could also be true of the Spanish Constitutional Court created 
nearly thirty years later. The Constitutional Courts share several 
characteristics: exclusive constitutional subject matter jurisdiction 
(neither is a supreme court of appeal for general legal claims like the 
144 CONSTITUIÇÂO POLITICA DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION] 1976 
(Port.); 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] (Greece). Surprisingly, the Portugal 
Constitution seems to have had little influence upon the Spanish Constitution. This is 
surprising due to their historical and geographical connections, their common twentieth-
century dictatorships, and the nearly contemporary transition to democracy. Portugal 
completed its democratic constitution in 1976, during the Spanish drafting process. The 
Spanish Constitution was more influenced by the German and Italian constitutions. ROBERT 
L. MADDOX, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 405 (3rd ed. 2008).
145 1958 CONST. (Fr.). Cyprus (1960), Monaco (1962), and Malta (1965) also ratified
new constitutions in this era. ELKINS ET AL., supra note 143. 
146 Andorra also ratified its first constitution in 1993. Timeline of Constitutions, 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, http://comparativeconstitutionsproject. 
org/chronology/.  
147 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at https://www.gesetze-om-
internet.de/englisch_gg/. 
148 Michaela Hailbronner, Rethinking the Rise of the German Constitutional Court: 
From Anti-Nazism to Value Formalism, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 626, 626–27 (2016) ( 
“celebrations [of the 60th anniversary of the German Constitution] captured the 
contemporary consensus about the German Constitutional Court, often described as one of 
the most powerful and most admired courts in the world. The Basic Law and many of the 
Court’s jurisprudential innovations have become export models in many foreign countries. 
For some liberal American scholars, the German Constitutional Court has even come to 
define the positive counter-model to the U.S. Supreme Court.”). 
149 JUSTIN COLLINGS, DEMOCRACY’S GUARDIAN: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 1951–2001 xxvi (2015).  
150 Id. at xxxv. 
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United States Supreme Court); both were created as capstone courts 
over a mostly unreformed judiciary, i.e., there was no purge of the prior 
regime’s judges;151 and both are final and supreme on constitutional 
issues. 
Additionally, as with many post-War constitutions, the rights and 
liberty protections of Chapter I of the Spanish Constitution are heavily 
influenced by the desire to advance and protect human dignity.152 
Although it is impossible to decisively trace the source of rights in the 
Spanish Constitution, there is significant crossover in the list of rights 
in the German Basic Law and those in Chapter II of the Spanish 
Constitution.  
Similarities between the constitutional systems were perhaps 
inevitable. Germany and Spain (as well as Italy, another influential 
source for Spanish constitutionalism)153 wrote their constitutions while 
transitioning out of authoritarian eras dominated by a single leader 
through divisive and repressive tactics.154 The preceding totalitarian 
regimes were not successfully removed by domestic political forces or 
internal rebellion. Moreover, both nations transitioned to democracy 
under significant international scrutiny—allied occupation and 
supervision of the constitutional drafting process for Germany, and 
European Community and NATO attention for Spain. 
The influence of the international and regional human rights treaties 
and, by 1978, international courts like the European Court of Human 
Rights, was a feature specifically welcomed by the 1978 Spanish 
Constitution. Article 10(2) of the Constitution states: “Principles 
relating to the fundamental rights and liberties recognized by the 
Constitution shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and 
151 Omar G. Encarnación, Reconciliation after Democratization: Coping with the Past 
in Spain, 123 POL. SCI. Q. 435, 437 (2008). 
152 MAR AGUILERA VAQUÉS & ROSARIO SERRA CRISTÓBAL, RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
IN THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION 15 (2015). 
153 Comparative Constitutionalism in Practice, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 543, 567 (2005); 
Enrique Guillén López, Judicial Review in Spain: The Constitutional Court, 41 LOY. L.A. 
L. Rev. 529, 530–32 (2008).
154 López, supra note 153, at 530. María José Martínez Jurico & Stephen G.H. Roberts,
How a Constitution is Made: An Interview with Alfonso Guerra, in 1812 ECHOES: THE 
CÁDIZ CONSTITUTION IN HISPANIC HISTORY, CULTURE AND POLITICS 337, (Stephen G.H. 
Roberts & Adam Sharman, eds., 2013) (“No, no, teníamos los textos. Teníamos La Pepa, la 
del 31, la italiana, la alemana [No, no, we had the texts. We had La Pepa, the one from 1931, 
the Italian, the German]”.). 
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agreements thereon ratified by Spain.”155 Such an interpretive 
provision, especially a mandatory one such as this, is an effective 
transitional strategy when a transforming country acknowledges a lack 
of rights enforcement experience among existing courts and judges at 
the time a new constitution comes into force.  
For Spain, this supported the development of a domestic rights 
jurisprudence despite the absence of a new or entirely reformed 
judiciary.156 This permitted significant influence from human rights 
treaties, especially through the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights.157 The influence of international and regional norms is 
particularly strong in Spain, where the Constitutional Court has 
amplified their impact. In addition to using the Constitution’s article 
10(2) command to interpret domestic constitutional rights in light of 
European Court of Human Rights’ case law, the tribunal applies 
European Convention rights with the force of domestic constitutional 
provisions, and has required lower Spanish courts to do the same.158 
For these reasons, one commentator noted of Spain, that “the capacity 
of the legal system to guarantee the effectiveness of the ECHR is 
virtually perfect.”159 In a further reflection of the transformational role 
of such alignment with regional rights bodies, the same author declares, 
“Spain is one of the great success stories of post-authoritarian, rights-
based democratization, and the ECHR is an important part of that 
story.”160  
155 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, art. 10, § 2. The 
complementarity of the jurisprudence is supported by significant textual similarities in the 
rights provisions themselves. The 1948 UDHR and the 1950 European Convention include 
a list of rights that are markedly similar to the final rights provisions of the 1978 
Constitution. This is an obvious result of Spain’s incorporation of the existing global and 
European norms—both of which were well established and respected by the time Spain 
wrote its Constitution; see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/; Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 131. 
156 See Mercedes Candela Soriano, The Reception Process in Spain and Italy, in A 
EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 393, 
394 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008). 
157 Pedro Julio Tenorio Sánchez, The Convergence of the Fundamental Rights 
Protection in Europe, 52 IUS GENTIUM 14 (2016).  
158 Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet, Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National 
Legal Systems, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEMS 677, 684 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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The final critical influence of timing on the Spanish Constitution 
relates to the relative maturation of the project of European integration. 
Indeed, Spain was drafting a constitution after twenty years of 
institutional organization and geographic growth for the European 
Community. The customs union was in place; the Treaty of Brussels 
had consolidated the three Communities (European Community for 
Steel and Coal, the European Economic Community, and EURATOM) 
and the Community had grown to nine member states with the addition 
of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973.161  
Indeed, Spain’s desire (and expectation) to join the European 
Community, i.e., that “powers derived from the Constitution shall be 
transferred to an international organization or institution,” is evidenced 
in the final text of the Constitution. Together with the rest of the 
substantial references to international treaties,162 Spain’s intentions are 
evident. The prospect of membership in the E.U., NATO, and the 
Council of Europe acted as a support for the core elements of the 1978 
Constitution: rule of law, political stability, market economy, and 
authentic democracy. For Spain, timely membership in the European 
Community provided support for its economic development goals and 
ratified its democratic transformation. 
4. Transformative Elements in the 1978 Constitution
New constitutions are often built upon rejection of their polity’s
prior constitution or a former regime’s perceived failings. This is one 
significantly helpful way to view the core features of the Spanish 
Constitution. Indeed, from its earliest declarations, the 1978 
Constitution is a refutation of Francoism, authoritarianism, and the four 
decades of Spanish government after the Civil War. Furthermore, and 
helpfully, it also rejects the no-compromise, imposition-by-the-victors 
model that typified the 1931 Constitution. The Preamble announces the 
Constitution’s purposes to  
Guarantee democratic coexistence within the Constitution and the 
laws, in accordance with a fair economic and social order; 
Consolidate a State of Law which ensures the rule of law as the 
expression of the popular will; 
161 See generally ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION chs. 8–10 
(Desmond Dinan, ed., 2006). 
162 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. III, ch. 3, art. 
93–96.  
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Protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human 
rights, of their culture and traditions, languages and institutions; 
Promote the progress of culture and of the economy to ensure a 
dignified quality of life for all; 
Establish an advanced democratic society and Cooperate in the 
strengthening of peaceful relations and effective cooperation among 
all the peoples of the earth.163  
These declared purposes of the 1978 Constitution stand in contrast 
to the Spanish legal regime and the evident state values in the Franco 
era. The Preamble’s core assertions of democracy, fairness, rule of law, 
rights protections, dignity, and quality of life for all Spanish persons 
and peoples of Spain define the values of the modern democratic 
country. This transformed state, a “social and democratic nation ruled 
by law,” is starkly different from Franco’s Spain.164  
This notion of reactive constitutional drafting—the idea that the 
provisions of later constitutions are starkly influenced by reaction 
against the perceived failures of the prior government—seems self-
evident in the constitutional history of many countries. Nevertheless, it 
is always difficult to attribute direct causation to the later regime’s 
constitutional decisions. However, even without causal certainty, a 
cursory list of disfavored characteristics of Franco’s regime is easily 
contrasted with the radically different textual promises of the 1978 
Constitution. This requires us to contrast the Constitution’s promises 
with the autocratic rule of Franco in a fundamentally authoritarian 
system of government animated by a fascistic philosophy. 
The most obvious structural change provided by the 1978 
Constitution is the return of meaningful, robust democracy. One of the 
core elements of autocratic governments is the consolidation of power 
in a single person. The restoration of adult suffrage and the division of 
elected representatives into multiple, genuinely empowered state 
organs is a flat rejection of autocracy. Moreover, the structural division 
of state competencies between national and regional authorities further 
refutes the radical unification of power typified by the earlier system. 
Similarly, if we understand authoritarianism as a system of 
government where “individual freedom is held as completely 
subordinate to the power or authority of the state, centered . . . in one 
163 Id. at pmbl. 
164 Id. at prelim pt., art. 1, § 1. 
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person . . . [who] is not constitutionally accountable to the people,”165 
the 1978 Constitution, with its numerous supports for the rule of law, 
is a stark transformation. At the highest level, the Constitution’s 
express application of constitutional norms to all state entities is the 
essence of the rule of law. The Constitution does this in the very first 
sentence: “Spain is hereby established as a social and democratic State, 
subject to the rule of law, which advocates freedom, justice, equality 
and political pluralism as highest values of its legal system.”166 Other 
elements in the Constitution’s preliminary title reaffirm the rule of law. 
Article 9(1) declares that “[c]itizens and public authorities are bound 
by the constitution and all other legal provisions,” and Section 9(3) 
affirms “the principle of legality, the hierarchy of legal provisions, . . . 
the certainty that the rule of law shall prevail, the accountability of 
public authorities, and the prohibition of arbitrary action of public 
authorities.”167 
These promises of legality and the promise of legality to all state 
actions are given a particularly anti-fascist formula in the extensive list 
of rights protected under Part I of the Constitution. The protection and 
enforcement of those rights are advanced by an independent judiciary 
and a specialized constitutional court (the Tribunal Constitucional de 
España), with additional state resources (such as the Defensor del 
Pueblo or Ombud) dedicated to securing the rule of law.168 
Additionally, provisions of the Constitution that circumscribe the role 
of the military and minimize the official role of the Roman Catholic 
Church also promote the rule of law as the foundation of the state. 
Part III below further explores these core transformative goals of the 
transition toward constitutional democracy and away from autocracy, 
authoritarianism, and fascism. 
B. The Spanish Model of Constitutional Transition
The final, and in some contexts most important, element to examine 
from the Spanish transformation to constitutional democracy is the 
process. The so-called Spanish Model of transition to democratic 
165 Authoritarianism, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ 
authoritarianism?s=t (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).  
166 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 prelim pt., art. 1, § 
1. 
167 Id. at prelim. pt., art. 9, § 1, 3. 
168 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 152–54. 
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constitutionalism is of significant academic and political interest.169 
Spain’s transformation, from authoritarian government to 
constitutional democracy, held significant appeal to a variety of 
countries in the late twentieth centuries and may continue to interest 
transitioning nations in the future.  
1. Characteristics of the Spanish Model
Although references to a Spanish Model of transformation extend
back to at least 1991,170 there is no unified definition of the precise 
characteristics of the model. In general, it describes a relatively 
peaceful transition from authoritarianism to democracy through 
negotiated, consensus-based reform without rupture of the existing 
legal framework through violence or revolution. Maintenance of legal 
continuity, the use of pacted negotiation, and the dominance of 
consensus-based decision-making are the hallmarks of the Spanish 
Model. 
The Spanish transition has been termed a “legal revolution.”171 This 
refers to the fact that the radical transformation to constitutional 
democracy happened without a sociolegal rupture with the extant legal 
system: no revolution, no coup, no overthrow of the existing system as 
the first step toward change. Rather (and rather surprisingly), 
significant initial reform occurred through the formal mechanisms of 
the Francoist state. At a critical moment, a royally appointed prime 
minister with no democratic legitimacy secured the support of the 
former regime’s pseudo-Parliament to hold genuine democratic 
169 There are some inevitable and interesting comparisons between the relatively similar 
and simultaneous transition experiences of Greek, Portugal, and Spain. Collective 
examinations of this third wave of modern European democratization in Southern Europe is 
fascinating but not directly relevant to this Article’s thesis. See, e.g., TRANSITIONS FROM 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: SOUTHERN EUROPE (Guillermo O’Donnell et al. eds., 1986). The 
congruent timing is generally considered an “interesting fact” without a compelling “macro-
level explanation.” Robert M. Fishman, Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe’s 
Transition to Democracy, 42 WORLD POL. 422, 425 (1990). 
170 Josep Colomer, Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way, 85 AMER. 
POL. SCI. REV. 1283, 1283 (1991) (“[F]requent and praiseworthy references to the Spanish 
model of transition to democracy have been made, generally identifying it with negotiations 
and pacts among political elites and consensus among the citizenry that avoid acts of 
revenge, violent confrontations, and civil war.”).  
171 STANLEY G. PAYNE, SPAIN’S FIRST DEMOCRACY: THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1931–
1936, 49 (1993); see also Antonio-Carlos Pereira Menaut, A Pointless Legal Revolution—
Constitutional Supremacy and EU Membership in Spain, 1978–2015, 30 Tul. Eur. & Civ. 
L.F. 81 (2015).
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elections featuring previously banned political parties exercising rights 
repressed until that transformative moment.172  
Such a gradualist transition avoided the shockwave of collapsing and 
re-creating all state institutions simultaneously. Major institutions of 
state authority remained in place until they were later lawfully replaced 
by new, also lawful, institutions under the new Constitution’s 
democratic values and democratic structures. The avoidance of radical 
structural disruption also meant that there was no wholesale purge of 
the civil service or the judiciary.173 Notably, the contemporaneous 
transitions in Portugal and Greece both included a sharper rupture with 
the predemocratic state, initiated by the military in both countries.174  
The second commonly referenced characteristic of the Spanish 
Model is that it was a negotiated transition or “pacted transition” driven 
largely by political elites.175 This was possible because of the 
nondisruptive nature of the transition, the openness of late-stage 
Francoists (especially Suárez) to fair elections, and the relatively weak 
electoral support for more extreme political parties and regional 
separatists. One author has described the elite nature as “[d]iscrete 
agreements and restaurant negotiations.”176 Additionally, the ultimate 
elite, King Juan Carlos, offered active support for the political change 
172 The Spanish term reforma pactada-rupture pactada (pacted or negotiated reform, 
negotiated rupture) describes this process: internal, agreed-upon reforms from within the 
system and then an agreed-upon but formally legal break with the prior regime. JUAN J. LINZ 
& ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION: 
SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 61 (1996). 
173 See Fishman, supra note 169, at 430. 
174 Id. at 430–31. 
175 There is an active academic debate about the relative influence and contributions of 
elites and civil society groups. For purposes of this Article, the debate offers little insight. 
Indeed, to the extent this Article focuses on the constitutional transition (through the Spanish 
Model) rather than the entirety of the post-Franco transition, the role of elites comes into 
sharper focus and is less controversial. Anyone who has participated in the drafting process 
of a collective statement for a large group of stakeholders knows that it cannot be done with 
all the stakeholders actually present. For legitimacy, there must be interplay between 
collective guidance and small group drafting. Guidance, redirection, and heavy influence 
can come from the larger collection of stakeholders, but a handful of authors will always 
achieve more than a mass of even like-minded folks. Of course, this drafting reality is starkly 
contrasted with the need for authentic public direction and engagement to secure genuine 
collective ownership. Constitutions, as broad collective statements of national values, 
political purposes, and governmental structuring, face exponentially larger challenges than 
day-to-day groups. Most constitutional processes address this, minimally, through express 
election of constituent assembly representatives at the start of the process and popular 
ratification at its end. 
176 ALONSO & MURO, supra note 2, at 4. 
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that was occurring.177 The engagement of the King along with 
democratically elected centrists and moderate political parties 
permitted substantial change while encouraging moderate, nonpunitive 
results. Importantly, this kept the military at bay, watchful but passive, 
and diminished the risk of an abortive coup led by reactionary elements 
of the armed forces.178 
The elite negotiated nature of the constitutional transition also 
promoted the use of consensus and avoided one of the oft-referenced 
pitfalls of the Second Republic under the Constitution of 1931. 
Decision-making through consensus allowed productive involvement 
of a larger array of political parties and, indirectly, increased 
investment from their collectively larger groups of constituents and 
stakeholders (e.g., unions, the armed forces, monarchists, and other 
interest groups).179 Of course, some groups excluded themselves from 
the process: Basque separatists, extreme groups on the left and right, 
and some others.180 But the formal inclusion of groups supported the 
image of the transition and inevitably affected the results, giving 
compromise a far better chance than it might have otherwise had. 
The result of the consensus model is evident when contrasted with 
Spain’s other twentieth-century constitution. Most critics of the 
Constitution of 1931 saw it as a liberal winner-takes-all document that 
targeted institutions that still had significant support in Spanish 
society—especially the Catholic Church, the monarchy, and the armed 
forces.181 This created allied opponents to the Second Republic and 
provided impetus for the Civil War.182 The choice to structure 
consensus-based decision-making into the process rejected a no-
compromise model that could easily have created numerous 
discontents. 
Neither this, nor the discussion and evaluation of the Spanish Model 
that follows is intended to cast the actual Spanish process of transition 
in an ahistorical, sentimental, or overly idealistic light. No historian or 
political scientist would suggest purely altruistic motives to historical 
actors. Historical motives are as mixed as modern ones—perhaps even 
177 See A King for Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1976, at A24. 
178 CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 220. 
179 Fishman, supra note 169, at 438. 
180 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 2. 
181 See id. at 4. 
182 Id. 
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more so when the stakes are as high as a short-term national 
transformation. As one commentator noted in 1989,  
Spaniards feared a return to the anarchic bloodletting of the civil war; 
they were determined not to let it happen again. King Juan Carlos 
feared the anti-monarchist sentiments among the newly legalized 
Socialists. The military feared a purge, and the left feared the 
military. By turning its back on old scores, and on its own blood-
stained history, Spain achieved the transition.183  
But, regardless of underlying motives, the procedural design that 
resulted in the Spanish Model offered a generally successful, 
compelling, and possibly exportable model for constitutional 
transformation. 
2. Appeal of the Spanish Model
There is little doubt that the Spanish Model has been attractive to
later constitutional transitions. Since the time of Spain’s 
transformation, the Iron Curtain has come down, Apartheid ended, and 
a variety of countries in South America, North Africa, and Asia 
transitioned away from one version of authoritarianism or another. As 
a consequence, the Spanish process was a potential model for nations 
from such diverse places as post-Communist Eastern Europe, post-
Apartheid South Africa, and Northern Africa following the Arab 
Spring.184 
For a host of nations, Spain provided a promising approach to stable, 
nonviolent transformation As early as 1989, one news article 
specifically referenced Poland, Hungary, Tunisia, Argentina, and 
Mexico, saying:  
[T]he Spanish model remains the most compelling one, and not only
for Latin American nations like Argentina or Mexico that were once
Spanish colonies. After the violent failure of heroic rebellions and
upheavals in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968, Eastern European innovators see Spain’s
183 James Markham, There’s a Demand of Instruction in Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
16, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/16/weekinreview/the-world-there-s-a-
demand-for-instruction-in-democracy.html. 
184 See, e.g., Paloma Aguilar & Clara Ramírez-Barat, Past Injustices, Memory Politics 
and Transitional Justice in Spain, in THE ARAB TRANSITIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD: 
BUILDING DEMOCRACIES IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 56 (Senén Florensa 
ed. 2016); see generally Charles Powell, Revisiting Spain’s Transition to Democracy, in 
THE ARAB TRANSITIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD: BUILDING DEMOCRACIES IN LIGHT OF 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 38 (Senén Florensa ed. 2016). 
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gradualist transition to full democracy as an alternative to bold but 
doomed leaps to freedom.185 
Notably, this favorable view of Spain’s transition is shared by Spaniards 
as well. In a 2001 poll, eighty-six percent of Spaniards were proud of their 
transition.186 
These favorable opinions highlight the value of examining the 
potential value of the Spanish Model beyond the Iberian Peninsula in 
addition to evaluating the value of the transformation to Spain itself. 
The remainder of this Article assesses the Spanish Model’s success in 
transitioning Spain away from Francoist authoritarianism and toward 
constitutional democracy—and evaluates the viability of foreign 
adoption of this model of democratic transformation. 
III 
TRANSFORMATIVE AND REACTIVE ELEMENTS OF SPANISH 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The Spanish constitutional transition was animated by entwined 
motivations: a desire to craft a new state in the model of modern 
constitutional democracies and a reaction against the disfavored 
elements of the Franco regime. Hence, Spain’s affirmative 
transformation is inseparable from its denunciation of its recent past. 
At a high level of generality, it is relatively easy to identify the primary 
perceived failings of Franco’s Spain from the perspective of the late 
twentieth century constitutional drafters. But closer examination of the 
process and the substantive choices of the authors show the interplay 
of the negative and positive motives. Moreover, it evinces how these 
particular transformative purposes were advanced by the Spanish 
Model of democratic transition. 
This Part focuses on three of the worst characteristics of 
preconstitutional Spain in order to highlight the transformative changes 
introduced by the 1978 Constitution. Autocracy, authoritarianism, and 
fascism are overlapping and related characteristics of Francoist Spain. 
For purposes of the analysis below, they are treated distinctly to support 
a close examination of the modern Spanish response in the values and 
textual provisions of the 1978 Constitution.  
185 Markham, supra note 183. 
186 ALONSO & MURO, supra note 2, at 3. Notably, this polling precedes the economic 
downturn of the early 2000s and the enlivened Catalonian independence crisis.  
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A. Democratic Constitutional Monarchy Replaces Autocratic Rule
The nature of an autocracy is the effective collection of power in an
individual without limitation from state institutions, other independent 
sources of authority, or the people themselves. Despite its moderately 
liberalizing evolution from the 1930s to the 1970s, Franco’s Spain 
certainly meets these criteria. The primary response to this 
characteristic is the creation of genuinely democratic institutions, 
which diffuse the previously unified powers among the voting-age 
populace and their elected representatives. But in Spain, the retort to 
autocratic rule also required a delicate but decisive reframing of two 
historically important institutions: the monarchy and the quasi-
independent regions. 
1. Democratic Structures and Rights
Under the 1978 Constitution, the Kingdom of Spain became a
modern parliamentary democracy. In fact, Spain held democratic 
elections in 1977, the year before the democratic Constitution came 
into force.187 Spain’s elections involve universal adult suffrage 
conducted through free, fair, and confidential processes.188 At the 
national level, representatives are elected into one of the two chambers 
of the Cortes Generales, located in Madrid.189 The 350 members190 of 
the Congress of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados) generally serve 
four-year terms selected through party-list proportional representation 
in their provinces.191 Because it is a parliamentary system, a majority 
vote of the Congreso selects the prime minister as the head of the 
government.192 The 266 members of the Senado (Senate) serve co-
187 See CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 227. 
188 Manuel Álvarez-Rivera, Election Resources on the Internet: Elections to the Spanish 
Congress of Deputies (July 24, 2016), http://electionresources.org/es/index_en. 
html#ASPECTS. 
189 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978. pt. III, ch. 1, art. 
68. 
190 The precise number of Deputies and Senators is based on the General Electoral 
Regime Organic Law (5/1985; June 19, 1985), within a constitutional range of 300–400. 
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978. pt. III, ch. 1, art. 68, § 1.  
191 Spain’s parliamentary model follows the D’Hondt (or Jeffersonian) Method, which 
slightly favors larger parties.  
192 Although the elected leader of the Congreso is formally the President of the 
Government of Spain (Presidente del Gobierno de España), the role is functionally that of 
a prime minister of the parliamentary body. 
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terminus four-year terms. Senado seats favor rural constituencies 
because representation is not entirely apportioned by population.193  
Although the Cortes Generales is bicameral, the chambers are not 
on an equal footing. The Congreso can overrule many Senado actions 
and the lower house has additional independent authority not shared by 
the upper house.194 The Senado’s independent powers are much more 
limited. The most important and contentious of its powers is its 
capacity to suspend local governments, which it did in October 2017 in 
relation to the Catalonia independence crisis.195 
The national legislature is joined by a host of other democratically 
elected institutions in the autonomous communities, provinces, and 
municipalities. Each level of government is guaranteed “self-
government for the management of their respective interests.”196 Even 
trade unions, political parties, and professional associations must 
function democratically under the Constitution.197 
Democracy, the antithesis of autocracy, is mentioned twice in the 
Preamble of the Constitution of 1978 (to “guarantee democratic 
existence” and “establish an advanced democratic society”) and in the 
first sentence of Section 1.198 These democratic values and the 
multilevel democratic institutions crafted by the Constitution are a 
direct and immediate response to Franco’s autocratic rule. The 
Constitution created democratic state institutions that allow for 
representation of voter will and the political will of regional and local 
institutions. They replace the unelected rubber stamp Cortes and the 
pseudo-democratic municipal committees of the Franco era. 
Obviously, the creation and empowerment of democratic institutions 
directly advances the affirmative goal of becoming a modern 
193 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 pt. III, ch. 1, art. 
69, § 5. Typically, the four seats for each province are all won by the most popular party in 
that province. An additional fifty-eight senators are selected by the legislative assemblies of 
each autonomous community. Each region gets one additional senator for each one million 
citizens. Because senators are representatives of their regions, they may be recalled by their 
regional legislatures. NEWTON, supra note 80, at 47. 
194 NEWTON, supra note 80, at 46–48. 
195 Sam Jones et. al., Spain Dissolves Catalan Parliament and Calls Fresh Elections, 
THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Oct. 28, 2017), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017 
/oct/27/spanish-pm-mariano-rajoy-asks-senate-powers-dismiss-catalonia-president. 
196 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 pt. VIII, ch. 1, art. 
137. 
197 Id. at prelim. pt. art. 6, 7; ch. 2, § 2, art. 36; and ch. 3, art. 52. 
198 Id. at pmbl. 
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constitutional democracy. It also rejects in principle and effect, the 
unification of power typified by Franco’s autocratic state. 
2. Regionalism, Ethnocultural Nationalism, and Autonomy
As discussed above, the Constitution of 1931 allowed significantly
more autonomy for the historical regions with strong ethno-cultural 
identities than was permitted before or after that brief period. The most 
heavily historically identified regions—especially the Basque Country 
and Catalonia—were given significant autonomy under the Statutes of 
Autonomy.199 These Statutes allowed regions to regulate a noteworthy 
number of local, domestic matters and to exhibit and promote their own 
language, culture, and history. 
Conservative forces in Spain were violently opposed to the idea. The 
autocratic nature of Francoism required centralization. Subnational 
autonomy, or peripheral nationalism, was considered an existential 
threat as worrisome as communism or atheism.200 Throughout the 
Franco era, the regions with strong national identities were targeted for 
special oppression.201 Non-Castilian languages like Catalan and 
Euskadi were targeted with repressive laws and punishment. Any 
promotion of regional independence was violently addressed by the 
national government.202  
The transition period following Franco’s death offered great 
potential to the autonomy-minded regions. But there was significant 
doubt that the former Francoists who remained in power would allow 
genuine autonomy even once the transition to democracy began.203 In 
fact, there appeared to be little consensus on the issue of centralized or 
decentralized power. The heirs of Franco on the right wanted a 
minimum amount of decentralization, while the parties on the left, 
including the regional parties of course, supported some version of 
federalism (in the absence of actual independence). An unlikely form 
of consensus resulted: both views found a home in the ratified text of 
the Constitution. 
199 See CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 9, 1931 pt. I. 
200 PRESTON, supra note 42, at 53–54.  
201 Omar G. Encarnación, The Ghost of Franco Still Haunts Catalonia, FOR. POL’Y, 
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/05/the-ghost-of-franco-still-haunts-
catalonia/. 
202 Goldie Shabad & Richard Gunther, Language, Nationalism, and Political Conflict in 
Spain, 14 COMP. POL. 443, 443 (1982); see also PRESTON, supra note 42, at 53–54. 
203 The animosity was strong enough that the Basque country excluded itself from much 
of the constitutional drafting process and urged its voters to shun the ratification vote. CARR 
& FUSI, supra note 66, at 244–45; PRESTON, supra note 71, at 144–46, 150.  
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In the absence of precise agreement, the constitutional drafters tried 
to postpone the inevitable conflict with a constitution of multiple 
possible solutions. Hence, the Constitution of 1978 asserts the 
“indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible 
homeland of all Spaniards” while acknowledging the right to “self-
government of the nationalities and regions.”204 The drafters elected to 
delay confrontation on the contentious issue so that regional autonomy 
did not derail the entire transition:  
“[I]n the exercise of the right to self-government recognized [in] the 
Constitution,”205 the Constitution recognizes but does not identify 
examples of “Self-governing Communities that may be constituted.”206 
As a result, the Constitution of 1978 attempted to have both unity and 
regional autonomy. Rather than establishing fixed determinations 
about regional competence, the issue of decentralized authority and 
regional autonomy was primarily left to a nuanced democratic process 
of writing and soliciting approval of a Statute of Autonomy that defined 
areas of governmental competence. Thus, the Constitution allowed 
regions to “accede to self-government and form Self-governing 
Communities (Comunidades Autónomas)”207 at their own initiation. 
Because each Autonomous Community negotiates the mechanisms and 
details of its own authority, each Community has a unique set of 
competencies and authority. The result is a form of “asymmetrical 
federalism,”208 where the division of national and regional powers and 
responsibilities varies by Community. Indeed, the process of proposing 
areas of competence through a Statute of Autonomy may be regularly 
repeated (every five years) to alter or otherwise adjust competencies 
within the bounds laid out in the Constitution.209 
In this way, the drafters of the Constitution included the limited areas 
of consensus in the text of the Constitution and insisted on a moderate 
204 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 prelim. pt., art. 2. 
205 Id. at pt. VIII, ch. 3, art. 143. 
206 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 pt. VIII, ch. 1, art. 
137. 
207 Id. 
208 See generally Luis Moreno, Asymmetry in Spain: Federalism in the Making?, in 
ACCOMMODATING DIVERSITY: ASYMMETRY IN FEDERAL STATES 149 (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellshaft Baden-Baden; Robert Agranoff, ed. 1999); see also Esther Seijas 
Villadangos, Answers to Spanish Centrifugal Federalism: Asymmetrical Federalism Versus 
Coercive Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON FEDERALISM 164 (2014), http://www.on-
federalism.eu/attachments/185_download.pdf. 
209 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 pt. VIII, ch. 1, art. 
148–49. 
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result, i.e., a negotiated framework for future definition of relative 
autonomy. The Spanish Model’s focus on consensus and moderation is 
evident in the decision not to decide beyond the limited areas of 
agreement. Any other approach could have produced winners and 
losers who may have threatened the larger transformational project. 
This shows another value of the Spanish Model. By deciding less, the 
drafters accomplished more. Moreover, the process that would 
ultimately apportion power between particular Autonomous 
Communities and the national government was structured to resemble 
the constitutional transition model: a binding agreement requires 
negotiated consensus between state and Community leadership, 
heightened majority requirements to ensure broad agreement, and the 
avoidance of extreme results (because of the extant constitutional 
limits). These constitutionally hard-wired requirements ensure the 
successful procedural characteristics of the drafting era are extended 
beyond the special, constitutional moment.  
3. The Role of the Constitutional Monarch
It would be disingenuous to discuss the constitutional reaction
against autocracy without addressing the (perhaps surprising) 
constitutional role of the Spanish monarch. From the peninsular 
unification in the Golden Age of Spain under Queen Isabella and King 
Ferdinand to the present King Felipe VI,210 the Spanish monarchy has 
always played a decisive role in Spanish history. Most of Spain’s 
constitutions have been monarchical.211 Even following declaration of 
the Second Republic and renunciation of the royal line in the 
Constitution of 1931, the exiled King Alfonso XIII acted as a rallying 
cry for important elements supporting Franco in the Civil War.212  
Of course, Franco failed to restore the monarchy following his 
victory in the Civil War, instead consolidating power in himself. 
Nevertheless, the monarchy was central to Franco’s plan for governing 
Spain after his own death. Alfonso’s grandson, whom Franco 
considered more reliably aligned to Franco’s vision of Spain than 
210 The current King is Felipe VI. Felipe became the Spanish King on June 19, 2014, 
when his father King Juan Carlos I abdicated in his favor. Rafael Minder, Spain’s Incoming 
King Takes Over a Throne Heavy With Political Tension, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2014, at A7. 
211 Adam Przewarski et al., The Origins of Parliamentary Responsibility, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 116–17 (Tom Ginsburg, ed. 2011). 
212 PRESTON, supra note 42, at 37, 209–10, 224; PAYNE, supra note 72, at 41–42; CARR 
& FUSI, supra note 66, at 33–35. 
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Alfonso’s son, would become King Juan Carlos I upon Franco’s 
death.213 Juan Carlos had been guided, counseled, and supported by 
Franco in the last decade of his regime.214 However, Juan Carlos’s 
commitment to democracy was greater than his loyalty to the deceased 
dictator. The restored monarch announced public support for 
democratization soon after his return to power in 1975,215 and in 1976, 
appointed the reform-minded Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister of 
Spain, who helped lead Spain to constitutional democracy.216 
King Juan Carlos’s support for democratic reforms was certainly one 
reason that the new Constitution included a role for the king and the 
royal family. But the Constitution of 1978 is nothing like early Spain’s 
constitutional monarchies, none of which effectively limited royal 
control over the government.217 Part II of the Constitution details a 
visible but carefully circumscribed role for the monarch. The monarch 
is given a variety of formal but largely symbolic powers by the 
Constitution: promulgating laws, summoning the Cortes Generales, 
appointment of government officials on the prime minister’s proposal, 
and others as one would expect in a “Parliamentary Monarchy,” as the 
Constitution identifies Spain.218 But, the king must make an oath “to 
obey the Constitution and the laws and ensure that they are obeyed, and 
to respect the rights of citizens and the Self-governing Communities”219
And, his acts are invalid unless countersigned by the prime minister or 
other ministers, denying him any actual legislative role.220  
Including a public role for the monarchy provides “a symbol of 
[Spain’s] unity and permanence.” And, subsuming the monarch’s role 
into the Constitution, as is done by Section 56 and other provisions, 
both accentuates the new state’s legitimacy and allows historical 
continuity within the transformative framework of the new 
Constitution. The compromise of retaining a figurative role for the 
213 See FERRERES, supra note 1, at 72. 
214 Portent for a King, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1975, at 28 (“From the outset, Juan Carlos 
heavily mortgaged his future to Franco at his designation when he swore on his knees in 
front of the Generalissimo to uphold Spain’s laws and institutions.”). 
215 Id. 
216 PRESTON, supra note 71, at 92–93. 
217 Przewarski et al., supra note 211. 
218 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 prelim. pt., art. 1, § 
3. 
219 Id. at pt. II, art. 61, § 1. 
220 Id. at pt. II, art. 64, § 1; id. at art. 56, § 3. The only exception to this rule is that the 
King may “appoint and dismiss the civil and military members of his Household.” Id. at art. 
65, § 2. 
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monarchy also fits perfectly within the Spanish Model of transition. A 
monarchic role satisfied traditionalists and placated the military 
without threatening the core democratic transformation. It reflected a 
consensus of the centrist elites on the left and right of the political 
spectrum and avoided an inflammatory result like the one made in the 
Constitution of 1931. In some ways, the inclusion of a democratically 
restrained monarch was a constitutional decision emblematic of the 
Spanish Model. 
B. The Rule of Law Replaces Authoritarianism
The importance of establishing the newly democratic Spain as a 
nation under the rule of law is evident in the earliest words of the new 
Constitution. The second clause of the Preamble declares the intent to 
“consolidate a State of Law (Estado de Derecho) which ensures the 
rule of law as the expression of the popular will.”221 This idea of a state 
that enshrines and advances the rule of law is utterly contrary to 
Franco-era authoritarianism. An Estado de Derecho is a sharp rebuke 
to the classic authoritarian focus on a single leader’s power and current 
desires over fixed, enforceable rules that apply to everyone.222 It rejects 
such a regime’s insistence on unity of party and ruler, malleability of 
legal rules, and oppression of dissent at the ruler’s caprice. 
The significance of this idea is immediately embodied in Part I of 
the Constitution, where the drafters presented the overarching tenets of 
the new Spanish state. Section 1 of the Constitution declares, “Spain is 
hereby established as a social and democratic state, subject to the rule 
of law, which advocates freedom, justice, equality, and political 
pluralism as the highest values in its legal system.”223 The meaning and 
effect of being an Estado de Derecho is made expressly and abundantly 
clear in the same Preliminary Part of the Constitution:  
Citizens and public authorities are bound by the Constitution and all 
other legal provisions. . . . The Constitution guarantees the principle 
of legality, the hierarchy of legal provisions, the publicity of legal 
statutes, the non-retroactivity of punitive provisions . . . , the certainty 
that the rule of law shall prevail, the accountability of public 
221 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 pmbl. 
222 Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “authoritarian” as “of, relating to, or favoring a 
concentration of power in a leader or an elite not constitutionally responsible to the people.” 
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/authoritarianism?utm_campaign=sd&utm_me
dium=serp&utm_source=jsonld. 
223 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 prelim. pt. 
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authorities, and the prohibition of arbitrary action of public 
authorities.224 
Such a comprehensive and emphatic assertion of the importance of 
the rule of law in the newly democratic Spain is an unmitigated rebuke 
to the malleability of law as a tool to serve authoritarian ends in the 
prior era. This section will focus on this fundamental role for the rule 
of law in the textual provisions of the Constitution, the enforceability 
of constitutional (and other) norms through adjudication, and the 
constitutional reply to the nongovernmental authoritarian institutions, 
Spain’s “de facto powers”: the Spanish military and the Catholic 
Church. 
1. A Rule of Law Constitution
First on the list of critiques of any authoritarian state must be the
absence of rule of law. Using the raw power of governmental authority, 
rather than the force of established law, is the hallmark of 
authoritarianism. The ruler, or the ruling elite, is the law. 
Authoritarianism is a particular form of lawlessness that allows the 
current desires of the leader or ruling class to dominate over established 
procedures, community values, or any fixed national principles. A 
lawfully established, enduring, and enforceable constitution is the most 
common foundation for the rule of law in the modern era. To the extent 
it fixes and enforces rules of governance, a constitution is a direct 
refutation of lawlessness or authoritarianism. 
At the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War, Franco took on his 
various dictatorial titles (most prominently head of state for life), 
banned opposition political parties, repudiated the Constitution of 
1931, and established his own government supported by a puppet 
legislature.225 As a consequence, Franco’s Spain functioned without a 
democratic constitution, without express or enforceable rights 
guarantees, and without an independent judiciary. Although there are 
many other vital elements of a government under law, the absence of a 
legally enforceable, rights-based democratic constitution is a glaring 
absence. The lack in Franco’s Spain is even more exceptional, because 
the middle decades of Francoism were a period of triumphant 
constitutionalism and rights ascendency globally. The post-War period 
224 Id. at prelim. pt., art. 9, § 1, 3. 
225 See generally PAUL PRESTON, FRANCO (Fontana, 1995); STANLEY G. PAYNE & 
JESÚS PALACIOS, FRANCO: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (2014). 
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witnessed dozens of new constitutions226 and passage of the United 
Nation’s International Bill of Rights and the Council of Europe’s 
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.227 
The direct response to the absence of rule of law in the Franco era 
is, of course, the 1978 Constitution itself. From a legal perspective, this 
is most evident in the thoughtful provisions to enact and enforce 
statutes, the structuring of multilevel state power, and the fixed 
distribution of power among state institutions. Additionally, an 
enforceable bill of rights is a specific, purposeful bulwark to the harm 
authoritarian governments can effect on individuals. The provisions of 
the Constitution of 1978 satisfy all these elements. For rule of law, the 
constitutional provisions are “law”; “rule” comes from the 
enforceability of these constitutional limits and compliance of 
governmental institutions with these legal norms. 
In Spain, the constitutional support for the rule of law takes on 
additional forms. Not only does the Constitution enumerate general 
civil and political rights—for example, free expression, political 
participation, and criminal procedural protections—but other 
provisions respond directly to the sins of the prior regime. For example, 
the Constitution’s prohibition on the death penalty was in response to 
the deadly, repressive early history of the Franco regime.228 Similarly, 
the Constitution’s extensive protections for those accused of crimes and 
detained by the state are easily explicable as a response to the 
dictatorship’s prolific detention of political enemies.229 Even the 
elements of sex equality in the Constitution can be viewed as a reaction 
to the oppressive sexism of the Civil War and Franco eras.230 
Overall, entrenchment of principles of the rule of law is a core value 
woven throughout the Constitution, and this is reflected in the 
consensus of the drafting period. The rule of law elements were novel 
for Spain, but not controversial. The provisions advancing the rule of 
law in the Constitution of 1978 were not subject to significant 
negotiation or compromise in the constitutional process when it became 
clear to the Francoist old guard that the era of authoritarianism was 
over. This was clear with the 1977 election results, if not sooner. There 
226 Timeline of Constitutions, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, http:// 
comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/chronology/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).  
227 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 155; Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 131. 
228 See CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 19. 
229 PRESTON, supra note 42, at 319–21.  
230 Eric Solsten & Sandra W. Meditz, Social Values and Attitudes, SPAIN: A COUNTRY 
STUDY (1988), http://countrystudies.us/spain/43.htm.  
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was little evident popular support for continuation of the prior regime, 
and any moves toward constitutionalism and democracy were 
implicitly moves toward a state subject to the rule of law. 
2. The Role of the Spanish Judiciary
The judiciary is a central tool of an Estado de Derecho because it
embodies much of the fixity and enforceability of legal rules. In 
organizing the judicial power in a constitutional democracy, the core 
focus is upon separating judicial determinations from democratic 
lawmaking, consolidating the power of adjudication in the courts, and 
protecting the independence of the judiciary. Legal determinations can 
then be based on established laws through fair and open processes 
separated from the prejudice and preferences of rulers, and from the 
short-term interests of those in power. This is an essential element of 
effective governance by rule of law. Part VI of the Constitution 
establishes a judicial branch of government with judges “accountable 
for their acts and subject only to the rule of law.”231 This Part secures 
the other characteristics of a fair and independent judiciary in its 
organization of court and judges: “The exercise of judicial authority in 
any kind of action, both in ruling and having judgments executed, is 
vested exclusively in the courts and tribunals laid down by the law, in 
accordance with the rules of jurisdiction and procedure which may be 
established therein.”232  
Because Spain’s Constitution was drafted a generation after most 
Western European constitutions, Spain could rely heavily on the 
models of other countries, particularly Italy, for the structuring and 
functioning of its courts.233 This also served the purpose of affirming 
Spain’s modern democratic bona fides for the European Communities 
and the Council of Europe, which it sought to join in its new era. As a 
consequence, although it was an essential component of the 
transformation from Francoist authoritarianism to modern 
constitutionalism, the provisions on the Spanish judiciary were not 
controversial and thus not subject to heavy negotiation or compromise. 
However, not all Franco-era power bases drew lawful power from 
state institutions or were unquestionably willing to constrict their own 
231 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. VI, art. 117, § 
1. 
232 Id. at pt. VI, art. 117, § 3. 
233 Comparative Constitutionalism in Practice, supra note 153. López, supra note 153, 
at 530–32. 
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accustomed authority to the new Estado de Derecho. The next two 
sections discuss the “de facto powers”: the Spanish armed forces and 
the Roman Catholic Church.234 
3. The Military’s Role in the New Democracy
Historically, the military was a critically important support for
dictatorial and authoritarian rule in Spain. The armed forces in Spain 
have always played an expansive role in support of the monarchy, and 
in twentieth-century Spain that role took on quasi-political dimensions. 
Most notably, Franco entered the attack on the Second Republic from 
his position as a general in the armed forces.235 After the Civil War, the 
military remained a core pillar of Franco’s power, perceiving itself as 
the last defense of Spain.236 Moreover, the fact that the military was the 
means of destruction of Spain’s earlier attempt at democracy in the 
Second Republic was often present in the minds of Spaniards working 
on the transition.237  
By the end of Franco’s reign, the military was definitively aligned 
with conservative political elements, the monarchy, and other 
traditionalist Spanish institutions.238 Many in the military perceived its 
role to be that of protector of a notion of a true Spain. This resulted in 
an abiding military connection to the status quo and the traditionalist 
elements glorified by Franco. A common (and realistic) concern during 
Spain’s transition to democracy was whether the military would 
overcome its authoritarian impulses and support the democratic 
Constitution.239 
In the transition, the Cortes, the drafters, and the political parties had 
to keep an eye on the military as they feared interference.240 Because 
of the fears of democratically inclined elites, the military was 
accommodated by multiple elements of the Spanish Model. The much-
discussed “moderation” of constitutional decision-making and 
“consensus” in the process were significantly the result of attempts to 
ensure that the military did not halt the transition through force.241 The 
234 NEWTON, supra note 80, at 18–19. 
235 PRESTON, supra note 42, at 131.  
236 Id. at 3–4. 
237 PAUL PRESTON, THE POLITICS OF REVENGE: FASCISM AND THE MILITARY IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SPAIN, 127 (1995). 
238 CARR & FUSI, supra note 66, at 21–24. 
239 See generally PRESTON, supra note 42, at 171. 
240 PRESTON, supra note 71, at 98–100, 129–31, 146–50, 195–204, and 206–07. 
241 Id.  
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support of the king, changes in military leadership arranged by Suárez 
prior to the formal transition, and the gradualist nature of the transition 
kept the threat of a military coup low.242 Additionally, the continuity of 
the existing legal framework diminished the excuse for military 
intervention. 
The actual constitutional text is somewhat more expansive than one 
would expect in light of the acute concerns during the drafting period 
about military interference. Article 8 of the Constitution declares the 
role of the military is “to safeguard the sovereignty and independence 
of Spain, defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order.”243 
Notably, this role addresses the habitual resistance to decentralization 
by giving the military a role in keeping the regions from 
unconstitutional splits with Madrid.244 But most of the details of the 
constitutional duties and democratic accountability of the military were 
postponed. The Constitution allowed for a later organic law to work out 
the details,245 a strategy that naturally minimized objections. As with 
issues of regional autonomy, the Spanish Model of transition facilitated 
consensus on moderate principles and postponed contentious details for 
a later date. This allowed the constitutional transition to advance 
without forcible objection from the armed forces. 
Indeed, these concerns were legitimate; the military did carry out a 
nearly successful coup d’état very soon after the transition. On 
February 23, 1981, armed members of Spain’s Civil Guard led by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero took control of a meeting of the Congress 
of Deputies that was selecting a new prime minister.246 The coup was 
motivated, in part, by the issues that the armed forces had long 
opposed: devolution of power to the regions, renewed violence caused 
by Basque separatists, and the uncertainties of democracy.247 However, 
the coup eventually failed. King Juan Carlos I appeared on television 
during the early morning of February 24 while the Deputies were still 
242 See generally id. 
243 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 prelim. pt., art. 8. 
244 NEWTON, supra note 80, at 18–19. This is also true of the primary governing 
legislation, the Organic Law on National Defense and Military Organization, 1980. 
245 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 prelim. pt., art. 8, § 
2. 
246 PRESTON, supra note 71, at 195–202. 
247 See generally JAVIER CERCAS, ANATOMY OF A MOMENT: THIRTY–FIVE MINUTES 
IN HISTORY AND IMAGINATION (Anne McLean trans., Bloomsbury 2011). The “thirty-five 
minutes” refers to a live recording of the first moments of the coup later widely shown on 
television after the coup failed; see generally PRESTON, supra note 237, at ch. 8.  
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being held hostage.248 Appearing in his uniform as Captain General of 
the Armed Forces, the king rebuked the coup participants, and stated 
that “[t]he Crown, the symbol of permanence and unity of the nation, 
cannot tolerate, in any form, the actions or behavior of anyone 
attempting by force to interrupt the democratic process of the 
Constitution, which the Spanish people approved at the time of the 
referendum.”249 The statement damaged the asserted purpose to restore 
the monarchy and challenged the claims that the military was acting on 
behalf of the Spanish people. Along with other factors, the king’s 
actions facilitated the ultimate failure of the coup eighteen hours after 
the deputies had been seized by the members of the Civil Guard.  
The failed coup weakened the influence of the military leadership 
but left untouched its constitutional and organic law authority. The later 
convictions of the coup leaders and others associated with the coup 250 
had the result of strengthening the rule of law by demonstrating that 
even one of the “de facto powers” with a long history of influence was 
subject to the Constitution and the rule of law.251 Of course, one 
additional result of the coup was that it strongly reinforced support for 
Juan Carlos I and the Spanish monarchy, and reaffirmed the viability 
of Spain’s fledgling democracy. 
4. Catholicism and the State
Religion, especially Roman Catholicism, has always been a
significant factor in Spanish self-definition and Spanish politics. From 
the rule of Isabella and Ferdinand, the “Reyes Catolicos” of Spain’s 
Golden Era, to the significant constitutional debate about the role of the 
typically pro-Francoist Church in the constitutional democracy 
launched in 1978, the Roman Catholic Church has long been concerned 
with its relation to Spain and vice versa.252 Catholicism was a core 
characteristic by which fifteenth-century Spain defined itself as a 
248 PRESTON, supra note 237, at ch. 8. 
249 Spanish King Juan Carlos I’s Speech Defeated a Coup [Notable and Quotable], 
WALL ST. JOURNAL, (June 3, 2014) https://www.wsj.com/articles/notable-quotable-
1401827637; for a contemporary account, see James Markham, Spain’s Rightist Civil 
Guards Seize Parliament Amid Vote on Premier, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1981, at A1. 
250 LAUREN MCLAREN, CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHERN EUROPE: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ITALY, SPAIN, AND TURKEY 210 (2008). 
251 See generally NARCIS SERRA, THE MILITARY TRANSITION: DEMOCRATIC REFORM 
OF THE ARMED FORCES ch. 5–6 (2010). 
252 See generally STANLEY G. PAYNE, SPANISH CATHOLICISM: AN HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW (1984). 
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nation.253 Iberian Spain was intended to be united as a Catholic country 
reclaimed from centuries of Muslim occupation.254 Religion often 
dictated international relations, most obviously as one of the motives 
for Spain’s global expansion through empire.255 Spreading the Catholic 
faith justified conquest and colonialism and defending it was a defining 
duty of the monarchs over the centuries.  
Contrarily, the denial of special prerogatives to the Church defined 
the modern, liberal state created in the Constitution of 1931. The 
Second Republic’s secularist vision of Spain stood in sharp contrast to 
the preceding centuries of Catholic or divided Catholic and Muslim 
rule. It was also a prime motive and rallying cry for traditionalists and 
nationalists in the Spanish Civil War.256 
The “antireligious” restrictions on Catholicism in the Constitution 
of 1931 yielded to a triumphant association (and robust support) of the 
Catholic Church with Franco’s rebellion and regime.257 One of the 
defining characteristics of Spain under Franco was its close and 
complementary relationship with the Roman Catholic Church. Each 
affirmed the authority of the other to augment its own power.258 Indeed, 
one historian described Catholicism as “the most potent weapon in the 
right-wing armoury” during the Spanish Civil War—although noting 
that the tool was, “to a certain extent, placed there by Republican and 
Socialist impudence” in 1931.259 These historical swings between 
significant authority and minimal influence for the Spanish Church—
more commonly, significant influence—defined Spain until 1978. 
It was inevitable that the role of religion, and more specifically 
Catholicism, would be a contentious issue in the Constitution of 1978. 
Indeed, constitutional decision-making in this area seems to be more 
particularly good evidence of the compromise and moderation of the 
Spanish Model. Consistent with the Model, the Constitution did not 
return to the secularism of the Constitution of 1931 nor did it continue 
253 Id. 
254 HENRY KAMEN, EMPIRE: HOW SPAIN BECAME A WORLD POWER 1492–1763 16–17 
(2002); J.H. ELLIOT, supra note 20, at 17. 
255 J.H. ELLIOT, supra note 20, at 68, 86; KAMEN, supra note 254, at 375–76. 
256 PRESTON, supra note 237, at 59–60. 
257 Id.   
258 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Spain), Concordat with the Holy See, August 27th, 
1953, CONCORDAT WATCH, http://www.concordatwatch.eu/showtopic.php?org_id=845 
&kb_header_id=34561 (last visited Nov. 1, 2018); see generally SPAIN: A COUNTRY STUDY 
110 (Eric Solsten & Sandra W. Meditz, eds.1988), http://countrystudies.us/spain/44.htm. 
259 PRESTON, supra note 42, at 59. 
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the symbiotic relationship of Franco’s Spain. Instead, it exhibits rights-
based liberalism in the form of modern constitutional religious liberty 
protections and it also embraces the special historical and cultural 
significance of Roman Catholicism. These related constitutional 
elements certainly exhibit some tension, but at the very least they have 
mitigated the claims of anticlericalism from the Constitution of 1931 
and the excessive entanglement of church and state in the Franco era.260 
Hence, the Constitution includes traditional religious liberty rights, 
robust freedom of belief, and freedom to practice one’s religion: 
“Freedom of ideology, religion and worship of individuals and 
communities is guaranteed, with no other restriction on their expression 
than may be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law.”261 
Additionally, one’s religion may not be subject to forced disclosure, a 
provision clearly responsive to elements of enforced confessionalism 
during the Franco regime.262 And, of course, religion is a prohibited 
ground of discrimination in the equality clause of the Constitution.263 
However, the Spanish treatment of religion is not secularist nor 
purely focused on individuals’ religious liberty. Instead, the 
Constitution requires neutrality with a notable exception. Although it 
states that “[n]o religion shall have a state character,” it nevertheless 
requires some special accommodation of Catholicism by state entities: 
“The public authorities shall take into account the religious beliefs of 
Spanish society and shall consequently maintain appropriate 
cooperative relations with the Catholic Church and other 
confessions.”264 This latter element is justified as an acknowledgement 
of the important historical role of the Spanish Catholic Church, 
260 It should be noted that the Roman Catholic Church’s own views about engagement 
with official state institutions generally and with Franco particularly evolved importantly 
during the twentieth century, particularly following the Second Vatican Council when the 
Church embraced the reality of plural faiths in traditionally Catholic states. Javier Martinez-
Torrón, Religious Freedom and Democratic Change in Spain, 2006 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 777, 
790 (2006). 
261 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 2, § 1, art. 
16, § 1. 
262 “No one may be compelled to make statements regarding his or her ideology, religion 
or beliefs.” CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 2, § 
1, art. 16, § 2. 
263 Id. at pt. I, ch. 2, art. 14; and “The public authorities guarantee the right of parents to 
ensure that their children receive religious and moral instruction in accordance with their 
own convictions.” Id. at pt. I, ch. 2, § 21, art. 27, § 2. 
264 Id. at pt. I, ch. 2, § 1, art. 16, § 3. 
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inseparable from Spain’s historical self-understanding and the 
substantial majority of Spaniards who identify as Catholic.265  
This special relationship arguably creates tension with the equality 
clause’s nondiscrimination language and the general neutrality model 
of the religious liberty provisions. Some elements of Spanish church-
state relations are fairly common, while others carry accommodation 
close to favoritism.266 As with regional autonomy and military issues, 
the Constitution leaves many of the details to special legislation to 
decide. This occurred with passage of the Organic Law of Religious 
Freedom in July 1980, the first such organic law completed after 
ratification.267 Although the Constitution does not require an organic 
law to clarify the state’s accommodation of the Catholic Church (as it 
did with other contentious issues), the number and sensitivity of issues 
argued for such clarification. The use of the absolute majority 
legislative process also has the effect of continuing the drafting 
period’s consensus model.  
The Spanish example of moderation and compromise, where present 
provisions are improved through examination of past mistakes, reflects 
a fascinating alternative approach to Spain’s previous models. Prior 
constitutional missteps—winner-take-all provisions with insufficient 
popular support, radical changes to the status quo, or too many changes 
at once—were mostly avoided. Even in the area of church-state 
relations, where the Spanish position of compromise favors religion far 
more than most Western nations would permit, the Spanish Model 
serves the goal of successful transition with sensitivity to uniquely 
Spanish factors. In a contentious sociolegal area, the carefully 
265 Seventy-five percent of Spaniards identify as Roman Catholic but only a small 
minority are actively religious and participate regularly in Catholic rituals. Giles Tremlett, 
Spain is Still a Very Roman Catholic Country, but Times are Changing, THE GUARDIAN, 
(Mar. 31, 2011) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/31/neweurope-spain-
catholics-church-influence. In fact, Spain signed a series of four agreements about church-
state relations with the Vatican just one week after the Constitution was ratified. Javier 
Martinez-Torrón, supra note 260, at 794 (2006). 
266 For example, religious bodies receive organizational tax breaks, their direct donors 
also receive tax incentives for supporting their religions, and there are some forms of direct 
financial assistance available to registered religious groups. Currently, this third benefit is 
only received by the Catholic Church. Additionally, religious instruction occurs in public 
schools as well. See, e.g., id. at 725–36. 
267 LEY ORGÁNICA 7/1980, DE 5 DE JULIO, DE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA [Organic Law of 
Religious Liberty] (July 1980), http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1980/07/24/pdfs/A16804-
16805.pdf. 
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negotiated compromise served an important “pacifying function.”268 
This was possible because the 1978 Constitution avoided creating 
either another Catholic confessional state or a purposively secularist 
state.  
C. Entrenched Constitutional Rights Replace Fascism
Spain in the Franco era can be understood as fascist, especially in 
the earliest years, because it was a regime that valued the state over 
individual or regional interests, with a centralized autocratic 
government headed by an authoritarian leader that exhibited rigid 
economic and social regimentation through forcible suppression of any 
political opposition or contrary social movements.269 While many of 
the elements of the 1978 Constitution are directly contrary to Spain’s 
past fascist characteristics, the focus of this section is on the adoption 
of the twentieth-century model of human rights protections. Human 
rights regimes were the international legal response to the global 
calamity caused by fascism in the Second World War. Spain was a 
tardy member to U.N. and European human rights institutions because 
its authoritarian government lasted decades longer than those of the 
Axis powers. The result was that democratic Spain established a 
belated domestic rights framework in an already existing international 
human rights environment. 
1. The Role of Spain’s Tribunal Constitucional
For purposes of this Article, I have separated the discussion of the
Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional de España) 
from the Spanish judiciary. This is justified by their distinct functions 
and by differing roles in the transition to constitutional democracy. 
Where the role of the regular Spanish judiciary was a traditional 
judicial role, serving the rule of law generally, the Constitutional Court 
has a more specialized role as guarantor of the promises in the 
Constitution. To the extent a constitution makes binding promises, 
there must be an institution to enforce them. In Spain, as in most 
countries, that institution is a constitutional court.270 The Court polices 
268 FERRERES, supra note 1, at 22–23. 
269 Merriam Webster Dictionary defines fascism as “a political philosophy, movement, 
or regime . . . that exalts nation and often race above the individual and that stands for a 
centralized autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, severe economic and social 
regimentation, and forcible suppression of opposition.” Fascism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fascism.  
270 Lech Garlicki, Constitutional Courts Versus Supreme Courts, 5 INTL J. CONST. L. 
44, 44 (2007). 
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the constitutional promises related to the organization of the state, 
division of legislative competence and authority, and—in the focus 
below—protection of individual and collective constitutional rights.  
Notably, this schema—treating as distinct the general legal and 
specialized constitutional roles of state judicial institutions—is an 
unusual perspective for most readers from North America and other 
regions more closely tied to the British legal traditions. In those 
countries, the highest appellate (judicial) court often performs a double 
duty as the national constitutional court: the Supreme Court of the 
United States and the Supreme Court of Canada are the prominent 
examples of this different model. The Spanish institutional 
organization is typical of European states and, indeed, far more 
common globally.271  
In the typical European model, the constitution assigns the special 
task of constitutional interpretation, including rights adjudication, to a 
specialized court or tribunal—often exclusively. The constitutional 
court model highlights the special role, tasks, and authority of a tribunal 
with such powers, especially the weighty power of constitutional 
judicial review. This model, formulated by Hans Kelsen for the Second 
Austrian Republic in 1920,272 is commonly contrasted with the 
American model.273 Although commonly labeled a “court,” a 
constitutional court in Kelsen’s model is not merely another judicial 
institution; it is an adjudicatory body outside the judiciary.274 A 
constitutional court is typically given authority to review only 
constitutional issues, not disputes without a constitutional character.275 
Moreover, such a court typically has exclusive authority to review 
constitutional claims, requiring lower courts to refer such issues to the 
specialized court.276  
Spain follows the Kelsenian model closely. The Spanish 
Constitutional Court is created and empowered in Part IX of the 
Constitution, rather than in Part VI, which describes the role of the 
271 Louis Favoreau, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 46 (Louis 
Henkin & Albert J. Resenthal eds., 1990) 
272 Id. 
273 See Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy, 25 W. 
EUR. POL. 77, 79 (2002); Garlicki, supra note 270. 
274 Sweet, supra note 273, at 79–80. 
275 Id.  
276 Id.  
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judiciary as a whole.277 The Spanish Constitutional Court has authority 
to consider constitutional issues only and is the primary and supreme 
state institution empowered to rule on the constitutionality of laws. As 
is common of constitutional courts, members of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court must be selected through special processes. In 
Spain, the appointment of magistrados (justices) of the Constitutional 
Court requires super majority support from Congreso and the Senado 
for all nominees originating from those institutions.278 Each Spanish 
justice must have special, relevant qualifications, and each serves a 
nine-year term, with three members leaving the court every three 
years.279 
One objective of the Kelsen model is to highlight the extrajudicial 
nature of constitutional court power.280 This characteristic may be why 
constitutional courts are more globally popular than the American 
model: they acknowledge the exceptional authority of judicial review, 
highlight the elevated stature of constitutional norms, and reiterate the 
distinct nature of the value-rich and purposive interpretation that a 
constitution (unlike a statute or contract) requires. Such attitudes 
toward constitutional courts reaffirm the legal and transformative 
power of constitutional rights enforcement, a refutation of fascist 
disregard for the dignity and worth of all human beings.  
In fact, prominent scholars have shown that robust constitutional 
judicial review has often arisen in the aftermath of authoritarian 
regimes.281 In such stark transitions, the constitutional courts take on a 
distinct, protective role to facilitate the transformation. On its twenty-
fifth anniversary, King Juan Carlos I asserted that Spaniards “owe a 
great deal” to the Spanish Constitutional Court as the “guarantor of the 
rules, values and principles” of the Constitution and as “an interpretive 
guiding light and protecting bastion of the letter and spirit of our 
Constitution.”282 This special role is also reflected in the distinct 
relationship between the Constitutional Court and the Spanish Model 
277 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. IX and pt. VI. 
278 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. IX, art. 159, § 
1. 
279 Id. at pt. IX art. 159, § 3. 
280 TOM GINSBERG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 9 (2003). 
281 John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from 
Europe, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 1671 (2004). 
282 Words from His Majesty the King in the Commemorative Act of the XXV Anniversary 
of the Constitutional Court (Madrid, July 12, 2005), http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/ 
ActividadesDocumentos/2005-07-12-00-00/King%27s%20Speech.pdf. 
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of democratic transition. Unlike many state institutions created through 
the Spanish drafting process, the Constitutional Court is less a result of 
the process than a guarantor of it. The Constitutional Court protects the 
negotiated terms of the transition. It is the primary institution designed 
to ensure, within its capabilities, that the consensus-based promises of 
the drafting era are upheld. 
2. Rights Protections in the Constitutional Text
Enforceable rights protections, one of the hallmarks of modern
constitutionalism, are a response against all three elements of the 
Franco regime: autocracy, authoritarianism, and fascism. Individual 
liberties, including political freedoms, collective rights to language and 
culture, and the promotion of social welfare for all Spaniards, are 
forcefully antithetical to authoritarianism. The protection of such rights 
runs counter to the fascist use of authority to suppress dissent, oppress 
regional nationalism, and prioritize the desires of the state over the 
needs of individual citizens. This section focuses on the substantive 
content of constitutional rights in Spain because it is a direct refutation 
of the prior regime.  
a. Hierarchical Structure of Rights
The Spanish Constitution includes an expansive list of rights drawn
from postwar international human rights documents and extant 
democratic European constitutions—a broad array of civil and 
political, social and economic, and collective and cultural rights. The 
rights in the Spanish Constitution, though expansive in number, are not 
equal in value. Spain’s constitutional text establishes a hierarchy of 
rights: “A different scale of legal protection has been established 
among rights, such that some of them seem to be substantively more 
important than others, depending on the group they belong to.”283 At 
the top of the hierarchy sits the animating idea of human dignity—a 
common characteristic of postwar constitutions. As the Constitution 
says, “[H]uman dignity, the inviolable and inherent rights, the free 
development of the personality, the respect for the law and for the rights 
of others are the foundation of political order and social peace.”284  
Beyond dignity, the Spanish Bill of Rights (Part I of the 
Constitution) identifies different categories of rights. The differences 
283 AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 28. 
284 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, art. 10. 
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are evident in the textual division of Part I into Chapter 2 (“Rights and 
Liberties”) and Chapter 3 (“Governing Principles of Economic and 
Social Policy”).285 The relative importance of the rights is evident in 
the difference in categorization, their textual description, and their 
differing enforcement options. Generally speaking, traditional civil and 
political rights are enumerated in Chapter 2. They are described with 
classical fundamental rights language, are labeled “rights,” and have 
the broadest range of judicial protection options. Other categories of 
rights—economic rights, social welfare rights, labor rights, among 
others—are more likely to be relegated to Chapter 3. The Chapter’s 
title identifies them as “governing principles” instead of as rights, and 
they have no direct avenues of judicial enforcement or protection.286  
This division and hierarchy is not a Spanish invention. A similar 
hierarchy exists in the “International Bill of Rights,” the core human 
rights treaties of the United Nations: the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and 
Cultural Rights.287 Hence, it is unsurprising that this division is evident 
in hierarchies of kind and of enforcement in the Spanish Constitution. 
The text secures the hierarchy of rights in Section 53.288 Section 53 
begins with the assertion that the civil and political “rights and liberties 
recognized in Chapter Two . . . are binding for all public authorities 
[and] may be regulated only by law which shall, in any case, respect 
their essential content.”289 This “essential content” requirement 
285 Id. at pt. I, ch. 2 and 3. 
286 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 3. 
287 Initially, a single covenant was planned to expand on the principles agreed upon in 
the UDHR but the U.N. General Assembly agreed to split the draft covenant into two distinct 
documents in 1952. G.A. Res. 543 (VI) (Feb. 5, 1952). Indeed, the United Nation’s original 
differentiation in 1952 is the most obvious source of the ongoing division of civil/political 
and socioeconomic rights in most of the world’s constitutions. These documents, the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR, contained different lists of rights and subjected states to different levels of 
obligations related to remedies and enforcement. 
288 To understand this hierarchy, recall that the bill of rights includes Chapter 2 (“Rights 
and Liberties” consisting of Equality [Article 14] and two distinct Divisions. Division 1 is 
“Fundamental Rights and Public Liberties” (including many traditional civil and political 
rights, certain labor rights, and the right to education) and Division 2 is “Rights and Duties 
of Citizens” (including certain duties of citizens and additional economic rights and the 
rights of marriage and private property). CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] 
Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I. 
289 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 4, art. 53, 
§ 1. The Chapter 2 fundamental rights are judicially enforceable rules, with direct and
immediate legal effect. This point is made multiple times in the Constitution.
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prohibits Parliament’s use of law-making authority to strip away the 
inherent, intended protection provided by the textual right. 
The second part of Article 53 identifies the first two judicial 
remedies related to rights protection:  
Any citizen may assert his or her claim to protect the liberties and 
rights recognised in Article 14 [Equality] and in Section 1 of Chapter 
Two, by means of a preferential and summary procedure in the 
ordinary courts and, when appropriate, by submitting an individual 
appeal for protection (recurso de amparo) to the Constitutional 
Court.290  
These two special judicial procedures, the “preferential and summary 
procedure” in ordinary courts and the amparo appeal to the 
Constitutional Court, are available only for the core civil and political 
rights.291 So, Chapter 2 rights bind all government entities, and 
legislation that limits those rights is substantively constrained by the 
essential content requirement. But only traditional civil and political 
rights are identified for special judicial and constitutional protection. 
Depending on one’s definition of a Bill of Rights, Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution may also be included. Chapter 3, “Governing Principles 
of Social and Economic Policy,” includes an array of social welfare 
rights, some additional economic rights, cultural rights, and 
environmental rights, among others.292 However, the limitations on and 
guidance to state institutions in their tasks related to Chapter 3 rights 
are less stringent: “substantive legislation, judicial practice and actions 
of the public authorities shall be based on the recognition, respect and 
protection of the principles recognised in Chapter Three.”293 
Additionally, judicial protection is far less robust: Chapter 3 rights 
“may only be invoked in the ordinary courts in the context of the legal 
290 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 4, art. 53, 
§ 2.
291 Id.
292 In Chapter 3, some of the individual provisions refer to the “governing principles”
with the language of “rights” (“right to health protection,” “right to decent and affordable 
housing,” and “right to an environment suitable for personal development”)   and others 
are merely instructions to public authorities, in significantly varied language: “public 
authorities shall promote” or that the “State shall be especially concerned with. . .”, or it 
“shall promote conditions directed towards. . . .” Article 53, which robustly constrains 
substantive government limitations on Chapter 2 rights, are less protective of Chapter 3 
rights. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 3. 
293 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978 pt. I, ch. 4, art. 53, 
§ 3.
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provisions by which they are developed.”294 There are no claims absent 
statutory grant of rights or remedies. 
Finally, the hierarchical nature of such rights is additionally evident 
in the procedural requirements for related legislation. For “fundamental 
rights and public liberties,”295 related legislation must be passed 
through an “organic act” (ley orgánica). Procedural requirements for 
organic acts are more rigorous: any initial passage or subsequent 
amendment or full repeal must demonstrate an absolute majority of the 
Congreso on a final vote on the entirety of the bill.296 The purpose of 
heightened requirements is to ensure greater support and more 
complete consideration. The hope is that greater consensus will be 
evidenced in the passage of such laws.297 No such requirement exists 
for other rights. 
Although the Spanish mechanism of implementing organic act 
legislation for the core of its protected rights is uncommon, the values 
behind it are often present in the thoughts of constitutional drafters. 
This allows Spain to ensure that the spirit of compromise and the high 
valuation of rights (the Spanish consenso) are present when future 
amendments or far-reaching rights-related legislation is passed. In 
Spain, the heightened requirements of organic laws are an attempt to 
ensure this additional level of protection. This may be a particular or 
heightened concern for negotiated constitutional transitions. In Spain, 
it reflects an extension of the Spanish Model into the regular governing 
era (far beyond the constituting drafting moment). It encourages, and 
potentially forces, cooperation and moderation among political parties 
in certain contentious or important legislative areas of constitutional 
294 Id.  
295 Id. at pt. III, ch. 8, art. 81.  
296 Id. 
297 The Constitutional Court has narrowly interpreted the organic law protection from 
Article 81. First, the court has held that the list of rights that are subject to the organic law 
requirement is restricted; it is only Articles 15 to 29, i.e., Chapter 2, Article 1 of the 
Constitution. AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 30. This excludes a host of rights, 
most notable the right to equality in Article 14, but also the rights in Section 2 of Chapter 2 
(such as the right to private property in Article 33) that would seem likely to be highly 
protected as well. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, 
ch. 2. Additionally, the Constitutional Court has a restrictive view of when the organic law 
requirement applies to rights-related legislation—even when it relates to the short list of 
protected rights. The court will require organic law procedures only when the legislation 
applies directly to the Article 1 right. Laws that have an indirect effect on the protected rights 
do not trigger the special procedures. The Congress of Deputies has not struggled to achieve 
the requisite majorities to pass, amend, or revoke rights-related organic laws. A simple 
legislative majority is sufficient for all rights other than those in Chapter 2, Article 1 and for 
the non-essential elements of all rights. AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 30–31. 
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significance. Furthermore, it supports the drafters’ purposes by 
reassuring stakeholders that rights are entrenched: it secures the values 
and protections of the constitutional founding for future generations. 
b. Other Constitutional Provisions for the Protection of Rights
Additional rights-related elements of the 1978 Constitution are
responses to the fascist past and facilitate transformation toward, and 
maintenance of, the nation’s transformed values. Although this is not 
the place for a close reading of every Spanish constitutional provision 
that advances “liberty, justice, equality and political pluralism,”298 this 
Section examines three noteworthy elements that combat fascism by 
advancing transformed values and protecting substantive rights: (1) a 
transformative substantive right (equality), (2) a protective interpretive 
principle (the essential content requirement), and (3) a supplemental 
state institution for the protection of rights (the Ombud). 
(i) Equality
Like dignity, equality is a core constitutional value in a constitution
responding to a fascist past. Where fascism prioritizes particular 
members of the state polity—based on ethnicity, race, language, 
culture, or nationality—equality provisions reject state preferences and 
prejudices. Even the most cursory reading of the Spanish Constitution 
demonstrates the importance of equality. The very first Section of the 
Constitution tells the reader that “Spain . . . advocates as the highest 
values of its legal order, liberty, justice, equality, and political 
pluralism.”299 The importance of equality is reflected in the expansive 
language of the formal equality clause and its placement as the first 
substantive right in Article 14 of the Spanish bill of rights. It states, 
“Spaniards are equal before the law and may not in any way be 
discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion, 
or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.”300  
298 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution], Dec. 27, 1978, prelim. pt., art. 1, 
§ 1.
299 Id.
300 Id. at pt. I, ch. 2, art. 14. There are several notable characteristics of the text that are
reflected in the court’s jurisprudence. First, it includes both a list of impermissible grounds 
of discrimination and a more general prohibition on discrimination for unlisted conditions 
or circumstances, combining the two different methods most countries choose. This is an 
effective way to maximize equality protection.  
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However, the Constitution has more to say about equality. Where 
fascism uses the power of the state to advance certain groups, Article 9 
requires affirmative government duties to advance substantive equality. 
It is incumbent upon the public authorities to promote conditions 
which ensure that freedom and equality of individuals and of the 
groups to which they belong may be real and effective, to remove the 
obstacles which prevent or hinder their full enjoyment, and to 
facilitate the participation of all citizens in political, economic, 
cultural, and social life.301  
These obligations, to “promote conditions,” “remove obstacles,” and 
“facilitate . . . participation,” require the government to actively advance 
equality in Spain. The affirmative duties in Article 9 and the prohibition 
on discrimination in Article 14 combine to place a significant obligation 
on Spanish state entities to promote equality.  
Of course, equality rights are unique among civil and political rights. 
They are not single circumstance rights but rather require equal 
treatment and equal regard in all government actions. Equality secures 
a personal right, but it also changes the character of all state action. It 
generally forbids state preferences, prejudices, or disfavor. This 
potential and intent to change the nature of state treatment of 
individuals highlights the antifascist values of the Constitution of 1978. 
(ii) Essential Content Principle
Referring to all Chapter 2 rights, Article 53 declares that the
“exercise of such rights and liberties . . . . may be regulated only by law 
which shall, in any case, respect their essential content.” Certain 
inherent, vital elements of each right are meant to be protected, and the 
fact that significant authority is given to the legislature to manage the 
protection of rights does not mean that there are no substantive limits 
on their actions in this area. This protective principle ensures powerful 
protection of the core meaning of the constitutional rights, even when 
details of the rights realization are delegated to the legislature. The 
essential content principle protects the substance of each right as 
secured in the transition while allowing the legislature to ensure the 
protection retains vitality and remains effective in contemporary 
society. 
The essential content requirement is a substantive requirement, and 
therefore, it has been subject to interpretation by the Constitutional 
Court. Although the content must be examined “right by right and case 
301 Id. at prelim. pt., art. 9, § 2. 
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by case,”302 the court has identified general descriptions of these two 
complementary elements of the essential content requirement: “To 
identify what is the essential content the right will have to be linked to 
human dignity, [to] the recognisability [i.e., the core understanding of 
the right], and the legally protected interests. . . .Each right has its own 
[essential content].”303 
The “human dignity” element, a hallmark of postwar 
constitutionalism, is discussed above because it is the first of the core 
principles listed in the Constitution.304 There seems to be a special 
relationship between dignity and transformative constitutionalism. 
Additionally, understanding “recognisability” requires 
acknowledgement of the abstract meaning of the right: the meaning 
prior to its appearance in the challenged legislation. Because there is a 
meaning that “conceptually pre-dates the legislative moment,” courts 
can use that meaning to ensure the related legislation respects the right 
in such a way that preserves the constitutional intent for the right.305 
The third element, the maintenance of the “legally protected 
interests,” focuses on the desired action or liberty or decision that is 
legally protected for the individual right-holder. For example, the 
legally protected interest in the right of free expression is the lawfully 
protected capacity to express one’s own formulated thoughts or 
opinions. For the court, this identifies a substantive core of protection 
that “gives rise to the right” and makes it “real, concrete and effectively 
protected.”306  
These three elements will be examined by the court in a case alleging 
the denial of the essential content of a right. This is another area where 
the influence of a similarly anti-authoritarian and transformative 
constitution is evident.307 Article 19 of the German Basic Law says that 
“[i]nsofar as, under this Basic Law, a basic right may be restricted by 
or pursuant to a law. . . . In no case may the essence of a basic right be 
302 S.T.C., Nov. 18, 1993 (B.O.E. No. 341) (Spain).   
303 AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 23. [drawn from CCT 11/1981]. 
304 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution], Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, art. 10. This 
is a common place for this right and this value; many postwar, transformative constitutions 
put dignity in a primary place in their new constitutions. Germany is the most well-known 
example, GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution], May 23, 1949, pt. I, art. 1 (Germany); but also 
South Africa, Constitution, Feb. 4, 1997, ch. 1, § 1.a (South Africa).  
305 S.T.C., Apr. 8, 1993 (B.O.E. No. 11) (Spain). 
306 Id. 
307 AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 31. 
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affected.”308 In Spain, the Constitutional Court’s protection of essential 
content exemplifies the ongoing role of the court to protect the core 
negotiated agreement and facilitate the transformation that the 
Constitution represents. 
(iii) The Role of the Ombud
The absence of reliable substantive rights protections in a fascist
state reflects the priorities of the regime. Radically different values are 
evident in the role of the Ombud in the Constitution of 1978. Section 
54, the second of only two provisions in Chapter 4 of the Spanish bill 
of rights (titled “Guarantee of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms”), 
creates the position of Ombud (Defensor del Pueblo).309 The Ombud, 
“who shall be a high commissioner of the Cortes Generales, appointed 
by them to defend the rights contained in” the Spanish bill of rights, 
plays a significant role in the protection of rights and the promotion of 
rights-based constitutional values.310  
Elected by a super majority of the Congreso and Senado, the Ombud 
is a public advocate “responsible for defending the fundamental rights 
and civil liberties of the citizens by monitoring the activity” of national, 
regional and local authorities.311 The duties of the Ombud are 
predominately defined by organic law, but the Ombud functions 
independently on its own initiative or upon request from the public.312 
The work of the Ombud is focused on the acts of the public 
administration; the Ombud does not initiate or participate in claims 
between private individuals. Cooperation with the Ombud is required 
by law for public entities.313 
The Ombud’s capacity to bring constitutional claims against 
governmental entities is discussed below, but its pointed refutation of 
fascist or authoritarian government’s denial of rights is significant. The 
Constitution of 1978 creates the Ombud as a supplemental rights 
institution to advance rights protections for individuals. Moreover, the 
308 GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution], May 23, 1949, pt. I, art. 19, § 1 and 2 (Germany). 
309 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 4 art. 54. 
“Defensor del Pueblo” translates as “Defender of the People” but is more commonly 
translated as its functional equivalent, Ombudsperson. I have used the gender-neutral 
version Ombud. 
310 See id. 
311 What is the Defensor del Pueblo?, DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO, https://www.defensor 
delpueblo.es/en/who-we-are/what-is-the-defensor/. 
312 LEY ORGÁNICA 31/1981, DE 8 DE ABRIL, DEL DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO [Organic Law 
of the Ombud], http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1981/05/07/pdfs/A09764-09768.pdf (Spain).  
313 NEWTON, supra note 80, at 28–29. 
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authorization and support of a governmental institution to ensure the 
government complies with its own rules is a starkly transformative 
constitutional element. The Ombud is an actor within the government 
that is empowered to use the independent powers to ensure 
governmental compliance with the rule of law and the Constitution: this 
is the antithesis of authoritarian government. 
3. Rights Claims at the Constitutional Court
The authority of the Spanish Constitutional Court is national,
relatively expansive, and final. It was also the exclusive tribunal with 
direct authority over parliamentary laws, although other state actions 
can be reviewed by the regular courts in certain circumstances.314 As a 
consequence, the Constitutional Court has the principal power to 
enforce the Constitution through judicial review. The court can, subject 
to jurisdictional requirements,315 invalidate parliamentary acts, regional 
statutes, and regulations with the force of law issued by the national or 
Autonomous Communities’ legislatures.316 While the Spanish Supreme 
Court (Tribunal Supremo de España) has ultimate nationwide appellate 
authority over all non-constitutional issues, the Constitutional Court is 
supreme for interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution.317  
Although the Spanish Constitutional Court is a court of limited and 
special jurisdiction, the constitutional text and norms are binding and 
applicable upon the entirety of the judiciary and all governmental 
entities.318 The court’s authority to police the promises of the 
Constitution counters the fascist elements of Spain’s past by dispersing 
governmental power and reaffirming the supremacy of the rule of law, 
especially constitutional rules. 
314 Organic Law 6/2007 amended the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court to allow 
the Constitutional Court increased discretion to choose whether to hear amparo appeals. The 
same organic law also expanded the constitutional review authority of regular courts in 
relation to amparo claims. LEY ORGÁNICA 6/2007, DE 24 DE MAYO, POR LA QUE SE 
MODIFICA LA LEY ORGÁNICA 2/1979, DE 3 DE OCTUBRE, DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 
[Organic Law amending the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court], http://www.boe.es/ 
boe/dias/2007/05/25/pdfs/A22541-22547.pdf (Spain).  
315 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution], Dec. 27, 1978, pt. IX, art. 161–
63.  
316 Id. at art. 161. 
317 “The Supreme Court, with jurisdiction over the whole of Spain, is the highest judicial 
body in all branches of justice, except with regard to provisions concerning constitutional 
guarantees.” Id. at pt. V, art. 123, § 1.  
318 Id. at pt. I, ch. 4, art. 53, § 1. 
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In general, there are two categories of constitutional claims that can 
be brought before the Constitutional Court: claims initiated by state 
institutions and claims from individuals or nongovernmental legal 
entities. 
a. State Institutional Claims
The most common route for institutional claims to be brought before
the Constitutional Court is through references from the regular 
judiciary regarding unavoidable constitutional issues in lower court 
proceedings. “If a judicial body considers, when hearing a case, that. . 
. an act which is applicable thereto and upon the validity of which the 
judgment depends, might be contrary to the Constitution, it may bring 
the matter before the Constitutional Court.”319 In general, this process 
of reference ensures a unified interpretation of the Constitution from a 
single body designed to interpret the qualitatively different terms of the 
Constitution. 
Additionally, the Constitution allows the Constitutional Court 
access to claims from minority parties in the national legislature or 
Autonomous Communities. The former types of claims, which are 
commonly allowed by European constitutions,320 permit a minority of 
either legislative house to sponsor a claim of unconstitutionality.321 
These members usually belong to parties that opposed the challenged 
law in the legislature. In Spain, a group of fifty members of the 
Congreso or the Senado are sufficient to bring a challenge.  
Autonomous Community claims allow an Autonomous Community 
to protect its constitutional interests when the Community’s executive 
body disputes the validity of an action by the national government. 
Conversely, the national government “may appeal to the Constitutional 
Court against provisions and resolutions adopted by the bodies of the 
Self-governing Communities, which shall bring about the [temporary] 
suspension of the contested provisions or resolutions.”322  
Finally, the national Ombud (Defensor del Pueblo) can bring claims 
to the Constitutional Court. The Ombud role was created by Article 54 
319 Id. at pt. IX, art. 163. 
320 Wojceich Sadurski, Constitutional Review in Europe and in the United States: 
Influences, Paradoxes, and Convergence, in THE AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM REVISITED 
(Marcello Fantoni & Leonardo Morlino, eds., 2016).  
321 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution], Dec. 27, 1978, pt. IX, art. 162, § 
1. 
322 Id. at pt. IX, art. 161, § 2. 
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of the Constitution (with many details settled by a 1981 organic law323) 
for the specific purpose of protecting the individual rights set forth in 
the Spanish bill of rights.324Although the role of the Ombud is primarily 
investigative, the remedies that are available to the Ombud include: 
referral to the Public Prosecutor, independent initiation of claims of 
unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court, commencing of 
fundamental rights-based amparo actions on behalf of individuals, 
recommendations to public authorities, and reports to Parliament on 
rights-related matters.325 
Spain’s reaction to fascism and consequential promotion of its new 
constitutional values directly contributed to the significant number of 
state actors who can bring a constitutional challenge. This has at least 
three benefits consistent with the reaction against fascism and 
promotion of the new constitutional values. First, the plethora of 
permitted parties allows ample opportunities for the court to review 
potentially unconstitutional state action. This affirms the Constitution’s 
values by allowing the court to assess, and, where appropriate, to affirm 
the superior legal value of rights and other constitutional rules. 
Additionally, internal avenues of seeking redress for unconstitutional 
government actions promote the rule of law. Finally, the availability of 
legal remedies discourages extralegal means of seeking redress. It 
provides a de-escalating and lawful (and hopefully trusted) means of 
addressing political conflict. In a transition that valued moderation and 
peaceful, negotiated resolution of potential conflicts—and for a nation 
that experienced a shattering civil war—such a process has enormous 
value. 
b. Individual Claims to the Court
The second category of rights-based claims to the Constitutional
Court are individual claims: claims brought by real persons or legal 
entities for a vindication of their rights. The most common individual 
claim, and the source of the significant majority of all claims before the 
Constitutional Court, is the recurso de amparo constitucional 
(hereinafter referred to as the “amparo”). The amparo is the first of two 
323 LEY ORGÁNICA 31/1981, DE 8 DE ABRIL, DEL DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO [Organic Law 
of the Ombud], http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1981/05/07/pdfs/A09764-09768.pdf (Spain). 
324 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution], Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 4, art. 54. 
325 NEWTON, supra note 80, at 28–29; AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 36–38; 
LEY ORGÁNICA 31/1981, DE 8 DE ABRIL, DEL DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO [Organic Law of the 
Ombud], http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1981/05/07/pdfs/A09764-09768.pdf (Spain).  
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specialized domestic options for the vindication of a fundamental right 
under the Constitution. An amparo claim may only assert denial of a 
fundamental right; i.e., a right enumerated in Chapter 2, Section 1, or 
in Article 14 of the Constitution.326 
The Organic Law for the Constitutional Court lays out the amparo 
procedure.327 The law makes such claims available “against violations 
of the rights and freedoms. . . resulting from provisions, legal 
enactments, omissions or flagrantly illegal actions by the public 
authorities of the State, the Autonomous Communities and other 
territorial, corporate or institutional public bodies, as well as by 
officials or agents.”328 Challenges to traditional parliamentary laws are 
not directly subject to challenge through amparo.329 However, the 
amparo procedure and the work of the Constitutional Court has 
changed significantly since 2007. To deal with the high number of 
backlogged amparo claims, Parliament granted the court additional 
discretion over the claims submitted to the court.330 The bulk of these 
claims are now heard only by the regular judiciary; “it was time to trust 
Spanish ordinary judges and tribunals as the main fundamental rights 
guarantors.”331 As a result of the 2007 changes, individuals who wish 
to have their amparo claim heard by judges of the Constitutional Court 
326 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution], Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 4, art. 53, 
§ 2 (“Any citizen may assert his or her claim to the protection of the liberties and rights
recognized in Article 14 and in Section 1, of Chapter Two . . . by submitting an individual
appeal for protection to the Constitutional Court. This latter procedure shall be applicable to
conscientious objection as recognized in Section 30”).
327 LEY ORGÁNICA 2/1979, DE 3 DE OCTUBRE, DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 
[Organic Law of the Constitutional Court], http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1979/10/05/pdfs/ 
A23186-23195.pdf (Spain). 
328 Id. at art. 41. 
329 Even though a direct constitutional challenge of legislation cannot be the basis for 
the amparo, such a procedure can indirectly result in a declaration of unconstitutionality of 
the law if the challenged judicial ruling (that is found to be a violation of the claimant’s 
rights) is based on correct application of an apparently unconstitutional law. Then the 
chamber or section of the Constitutional Court that is hearing the appeal can permissibly 
refer it to the plenary Court for review of constitutionality. This is allowed because it is a 
referral of the question of unconstitutionality from a judge, which is permitted by the 
Constitution and CCOA, rather than a direct challenge to the law through an amparo. 
AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 47–8. 
330 LEY ORGÁNICA 6/2007, DE 24 DE MAYO, POR LA QUE SE MODIFICA LA LEY 
ORGÁNICA 2/1979, DE 3 DE OCTUBRE, DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL [Organic Law 
amending the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court], http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2007/ 
05/25/pdfs/A22541-22547.pdf (Spain). 
331 AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 46. 
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must now demonstrate that their particular controversy has a “special 
constitutional significance” (especial transcencia constitutional).332 
Consequently, the Constitutional Court is no longer the exclusive 
arbiter of amparo claims. Instead, the court plays a capstone or 
backstop role and, as described above, adjudicates cases of “special 
constitutional significance” at its own discretion. Rather than directly 
adjudicating constitutional issues, the court’s altered function is to 
indirectly ensure proper interpretation and application of constitutional 
rules through supervision of the lower courts.  
Even before the 2007 reforms, other (non-amparo) rights claims 
could be adjudicated through a “preferential and summary procedure” 
in an ordinary court.333  
The primary idea is that ordinary courts, which are plentiful and 
accessible (especially when compared with the Constitutional Court) 
should be the ones to guarantee fundamental rights in the very first 
place . . . an individual . . . should be able to go to the nearby court 
through a preferential and summary process to get immediate 
protection.334 
These claims are “preferential and summary” due to their simplified 
processes, shorter deadlines, and the limitation on subject matter to only 
fundamental rights.335  
The decision regarding whether the summary procedure in any 
particular case is appropriate is made by the judge.336 Hence, since 
2007, the vast majority of constitutional claims are brought and decided 
in the ordinary courts. Only institutional claims or individual claims of 
“special constitutional significance” will be decided by the 
Constitutional Court. In order to protect those fundamental Spanish 
332 LEY ORGÁNICA 6/2007, DE 24 DE MAYO, POR LA QUE SE MODIFICA LA LEY 
ORGÁNICA 2/1979, DE 3 DE OCTUBRE, DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL [Organic Law 
amending the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court], http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2007 
/05/25/pdfs/A22541-22547.pdf (Spain). 
333 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pt. I, ch. 4, art. 53, 
§ 2.
334 AGUILERA & SERRA, supra note 152, at 40.
335 There is no uniformity of process for these procedures. Various special subject matter
laws outline different processes; claims brought in labor law area will differ for claims 
brought under military jurisdiction, as an example. Additionally, there are even more 
specialized processes for claims that are inherently time sensitive; habeas corpus claims, 
election rights claims, etc. Id. at 42. 
336 Id. at 43. Parliamentary laws cannot themselves be directly challenged through the 
summary process. Rather, claims are brought against a public authority implementing the 
suspect law (even if the public authority is a lower court upholding or applying that law to 
the challenging party). 
70 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 20, 1 
rights, courts have shortened the timeframe for such challenges, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of an powerful resolution. 
Overall, the process and availability of judicial and constitutional 
court review now addresses a significant perceived failing of the 
Spanish judicial system: the inability to deal with amparo claims in a 
timely and effective manner. This development, achieved through the 
absolute majority process of an organic law, serves the larger purposes 
of constitutional review and affirms the rule of law. Moreover, the more 
diffused responsibility for the protection of fundamental rights, shared 
now with ordinary judges, furthers the Spanish interest in affirming 
constitutional rights in reaction to the general failure to protect 
individual rights in the years of fascism, authoritarianism, and 
autocracy. 
IV 
TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM FORTY YEARS AFTER 
FRANCO 
Assessing a constitutional transition and evaluating a constitution 
are perilous and potentially hubristic tasks. On the other hand, refusing 
to examine the results of such a transition or to appraise alternative 
methods of transition—especially for a radical transformation on the 
scale of Spain’s—hinders future constitutional progress. But such 
comparisons can never exhibit scientific precision; there are no control 
groups in comparative constitutional history or comparative 
constitutional design. Moreover, any evaluative conclusions will 
always be preliminary because of the unknowable number of years of 
future development for the constitution. There is no assured way to 
know if the current version of an extant constitution is in its early years 
or its late stage. Nevertheless, close examination and contextual 
appraisal are both possible and valuable.  
In addition to the inevitable subjectivity of such an analysis, there 
are unavoidable challenges to analyzing constitutional problems and 
solutions across geographical, cultural, linguistic, and even temporal 
differences. However, not all of such an evaluation must fall to claims 
of relativism. Most nations in the process of drafting a new constitution 
are rejecting a specific former system of government and set of values 
while pursuing an improved system with perceived better values. This 
accurately describes the Spanish transition. Thus, the transformative 
and reactive goals of the new Constitution provide a fair basis for 
assessment.  
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A. Spain’s Constitutional Answer to Authoritarianism
Perhaps the first test of a constitution’s success is how well it 
responds to the perceived failings of the prior regime and mode of 
governance. Does the constitution’s response to the preceding system 
of government address the faults of the past in an effective and 
sustainable way? For modern Spain, the question is whether the rule of 
law, democracy, the organization of the state, the distribution of 
national and regional authority, and the protection of individual rights 
viably counter the errors of autocracy, authoritarianism, and fascism. 
As shown in Part III, forty years after the death of Franco there is ample 
evidence that the current Spanish Constitution addresses each of the 
overarching faults of the past regime. 
A second, more affirmative standard also belongs in this evaluation: 
a new constitution must look forward and not merely back. Does the 
new constitution encapsulate the transformative, aspirational values of 
the polity it serves in an effective and enduring way? For reviewers 
who support the values of modern constitutionalism—rule of law, 
restrained governmental power, democratic governance, and the 
protection of individual rights—these are values against which the 
resulting political and legal system can be measured. It is particularly 
appropriate to evaluate the Spanish transition against these four 
common goals of modern constitutionalism because each is identified 
and lauded in the Spanish Constitution’s Preamble.  
Moreover, Spain’s pursuit of constitutional democracy occurred in 
the unique context of post-War, 1970s Europe, against the backdrop of 
Spain’s history of monarchy, Catholicism, failed constitutionalism, 
civil war, and Francoism. As a result, the Spanish iteration of modern 
constitutionalism included correlated goals: European integration, 
international community acceptance, national unity, ethnocultural 
regional autonomy, socioeconomic development, and the general 
improvement of the quality of life for all Spaniards.337  
Thus, the question becomes: Does multilevel representative 
democracy, adoption of international standards of human rights 
protections, a dynamic system of regional autonomy, and European 
integration advance the Spanish vision of modern democratic 
constitutionalism? The predominant (if incomplete) answer is yes. 
337 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Spanish Constitution] Dec. 27, 1978, pmbl. (“Guarantee 
democratic coexistence within the Constitution and the laws . . .; Consolidate a State of Law 
which ensures the rule of law . . . ; Protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise 
of human rights…; [and] Establish an advanced democratic society”). 
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Much of this evaluation is based on the relative stability, peacefulness, 
and socioeconomic maturity of Spain as of its fortieth anniversary. 
Today, despite its imperfections, Spain is a mature, functioning 
constitutional democracy. The Constitution of 1978 secured a new state 
capable of protecting human rights that also existed in alignment with 
European and international expectations. It secured this peace and 
significant economic investment through membership in the European 
Union. It modernized and de-politicized the role of its military through 
civilian control and NATO alignment.338 Finally, it entrenched 
expansive individual and collective rights within an independent 
judicial and legal system with all the significant indicators of the rule 
of law. These are undoubtedly hallmarks of a successful 
transformation.339  
As was shown in Part III, the expanded list of goals for Spain’s own 
form of modern constitutional democracy—derived from its history 
and expressed in the Preamble—was inseparable from the core, 
unstated goal of a decisive break from the authoritarian past. This is the 
entwined nature of the desire for constitutional democracy and the 
rejection of Francoism. The successful rejection of authoritarian values 
and reformulation of the Francoist state institutions were inextricably 
coupled with establishment of a modern constitutional democracy in 
Spain. 
However, this Article has focused on more than the substantive 
achievements of Spanish constitutionalism. It has also explored a 
procedural axis in addition to the 1978 Constitution’s substantive 
content axis. As a result, the Spanish Model of transition also needs to 
be evaluated for its contribution to Spain’s transformation and potential 
contribution to constitutional transition elsewhere. 
B. The Evolving Significance of the Spanish Model
The term “Spanish Model” refers to a relatively peaceful transition 
from authoritarianism to constitutionalism through negotiated, 
consensus-based reforms without disruption of the existing legal 
338 JAVIER CERCAS, supra note 247, at 370–71. 
339 It is important to note that any such assessment can only address the most general 
terms. Whether the Constitution meets the needs of each individual or of specific 
communities of common interest—for example, of Spanish women or gay and lesbian 
persons or workers—is a valuable question worthy of research, but beyond the scope of this 
Article. More acutely, the current Catalonia independence crisis highlights a similarly 
important question. The assertion that the Spanish Constitution is successful on its own 
terms does not dismiss the question of whether it does (or should) meet the twenty-first 
century nationalist aspirations of Catalonians. 
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framework through violence or revolution. Maintenance of legal 
continuity, prioritization of pact-led negotiation, and the dominance of 
moderation in final terms are the hallmarks of the Spanish Model. For 
Spain, the model provided significant value in the potentially violent, 
radically uncertain transition period following the death of Franco. The 
model promoted judicious results reflective of significant consensus; 
rejected the punitive, winner-take-all model of prior eras; reflected the 
centrist wishes of most Spaniards; kept political parties and other 
interest groups engaged; and diffused potential violent reaction from 
the military or extremist elements of civil society.340 
1. A Viable Model for Spanish Transformation
Ultimately, the Spanish Model of constitutional transition is
important and valuable only if it facilitates a peaceful transformation 
from authoritarianism to constitutional democracy. Does it facilitate a 
relatively effective process of constitutional change resulting in a 
rights-based democracy with enduring value for the nation and its 
people? To the extent that the characteristics of the process—legal 
continuity, negotiation, consensus, elite engagement, and 
moderation—supported the content of the Constitution and the 
expectations of Spaniards, the Spanish Model served the transition 
extraordinarily well. The Constitution’s fortieth anniversary itself is 
valid initial evidence of success of the Spanish Model. In the context 
of Spain’s constitutional history, a forty-year period of stable 
democracy is without domestic precedent. The longest prior 
democratic government, under the Constitution of 1931, lasted only 
340 Although this Article demonstrates the effectiveness of the model’s characteristics in 
securing a transition to constitutional democracy, it is worth noting that moderation, elite 
empowerment, and formal legal continuity are not self-evidently or universally praiseworthy 
in a democratic transformation. Moderation in the process may strike a balance between 
conflicting, coequal values and keep political opponents engaged in the transition, but it is 
less of a virtue when the outgoing regime is deeply racist or misogynist or holds some other 
value antithetical to constitutional democracy. It is not appropriate to only moderately 
condemn genocide, apartheid, or other distasteful government programs. Similarly, 
negotiations among elites may diminish violence but it might also empower the legacy 
actors of a violent, oppressive regime. The maintenance of formal legal stability, while it 
minimizes sociopolitical shocks, could be perceived as affirmation of a distasteful prior 
government and could support future political power for constitutionally misaligned parties. 
Although there is limited evidence of this in the Spanish transition, the concerns remain. 
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five to eight years (depending on how one measures the years of 
shrinking territory during the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939).341 
The forty years (and counting) of the Spanish Constitution are even 
more remarkable in the global context, where short-lived constitutions 
are the norm, not the exception. A recent study identified the average 
“lifespan” of a constitution as only nineteen years,342 and an even lower 
average, twelve years, for constitutions drafted since the end of World 
War II.343 Of course, years of duration could be an invalid mark of 
success if an allegedly democratic, human rights constitution were 
maintained by force or other means counter to the constitution’s rules 
or values. There is no such claim, as a general matter, in modern Spain. 
Even the most forceful claims of a denial of self-determination by 
independence-minded regions, whatever the objective validity, are 
claims from outside the existing constitutional framework. The least 
we can say at this stage is that the Spanish Model provided a successful 
process to transition from the still-entrenched post-Franco authoritarian 
state to a modern constitutional democracy. When viewed more 
generally, Spain’s transformation achieved the general goals of modern 
constitutionalism and the context specific goals identified by Spaniards 
in their Constitution.  
Moreover, the model’s influence did not end on the day the 1978 
Constitution came into force; it left a legacy within Spanish 
constitutional law and practice. The entrenchment of enduring 
processes that promote moderate, consensus-driven results supports the 
ongoing vitality of the transformation. The use of heightened voting 
requirements for the higher-stakes organic laws, the tailored autonomy 
statutes defining competence for the regions, and the Parliamentary 
nominations to the Constitutional Court are all examples of 
constitutional provisions that encourage viable governing relationships 
among people and parties with competing interests.344 
341 This was the Second Spanish Republic. The First Spanish Republic lasted less than 
two years from February 1873 to December 1874. Raymund Carr, Liberalism and Reaction 
1831–1934, in SPAIN: A HISTORY (Raymund Carr ed., Oxford 2000). 
342 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 143, at 2. 
343 Thomas Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, & James Melton, The Lifespan of Written 
Constitutions, https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/lifespan-written-constitutions (a 
summary of findings published in ZACHARY ELKINS, THOMAS GINSBURG, & JAMES 
MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009)). 
344 Of note, such entrenchment is not unique to the Spanish transition. Constitutions 
often protect certain decisions, like amendments, from easy alteration by bare majorities. 
(That is also true of many of the individual elements of the model; they were not individually 
inventive, just collectively effective.).  
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Arguably, the legacy of the Spanish Model helped with some of the 
acute challenges experienced by Spain after the Constitution came into 
force. One prominent example, the failed coup of February 23, 1981, 
could have been much worse if the transition had taken a harder line on 
the monarchy because the king exerted significant influence in 
denouncing the coup and brought it to a peaceful conclusion. The coup 
crisis also benefited from the moderating influence on the military 
exerted by Suárez during the transitional years, something made 
possible by the lack of a sharp disruption with the prior regime during 
the move toward democracy. Hopefully future research will ask about 
the legacy of the model on other important constitutional-level 
challenges such as the early Basque separatist violence, the austerity 
measures in response to the financial crisis of 2008,345 recurring 
problems with government corruption, or the current Catalonia 
independence crisis. 
2. The Spanish Model Outside Spain
Another marker of the value of the Spanish Model is its popularity
with other nations. As discussed in Part II, Spain’s transition model was 
noted and studied by countries in Eastern Europe as they began their 
transitions to democracy a decade later. And other versions of pacted, 
negotiated “legal revolutions” followed. Other than the more obvious, 
analogous processes in postcommunist Eastern Europe, another 
prominent example in comparative constitutional study is South Africa 
as it transformed itself from apartheid authoritarianism to full 
constitutional democracy. Like Spain, South Africa’s transition was 
aided by party-led negotiations using the existing legal framework to 
craft a new rights-based constitution and legitimize a radical 
transformation. Of course, it is even more challenging to assess 
whether these model exports were successful. On the one hand, these 
countries left behind communist and apartheid authoritarianism for 
genuine democratic governance. But many of these nations have 
struggled to maintain their commitments to democratic 
constitutionalism.346  
345 See Laurence Knight, Spanish Economy: What Is to Blame for Its Problems?, BBC 
NEWS (May 18, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17753891; Vanessa Drucker, 
A New Sunrise for Spain?, GLOBAL FIN. (June 6, 2014), http://www.gfmag.com/magazine/ 
june-2014/new-sunrise-spain. 
346 See ALEX BORRAINE, WHAT’S GONE WRONG? SOUTH AFRICA ON THE BRINK OF 
FAILED STATEHOOD (2014); PAUL BLOKKER, NEW DEMOCRACIES IN CRISIS? A 
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There is good reason to imagine that models for transition away from 
authoritarian governance will be needed in the future. The Human 
Rights Foundation notes that, “citizens of 94 countries suffer under 
non-democratic regimes, meaning that 3.97 billion people are currently 
controlled by tyrants, absolute monarchs, military juntas, or 
competitive authoritarians. That includes 53 percent of the world’s 
population.”347 These statistics support the claim that “the 
authoritarianism business is booming.”348 It is consistent with the 
values of constitutionalism to support nonviolent, democratic 
transitions in such countries wherever possible. 
Importantly, just the existence of models of transition away from 
authoritarianism, where the ruler and the ruler’s supporters are not 
ousted, killed, or punished, may encourage democratic transitions. The 
end of authoritarian regimes is a dangerous time for the former 
oppressor. Despite the limited concern one may feel for the entrenched 
autocrat, few people are served by maintenance of an unjust system. 
This is an additional way in which Spain’s past peaceful transition 
advocates for future foreign adoption of its process of democratic 
transformation.  
For all its apparent success, there are many challenges ahead for 
Spanish constitutionalism, which will inevitably affect our evaluation 
of the transferability of the Spanish Model. As the recent Catalonian 
independence actions have highlighted, the Spanish version of 
significant decentralization and asymmetrical federalism may not be 
viable. Spain is not the only country experiencing centrifugal forces of 
nationalism and it is unclear what role domestic constitutions can play 
in such passionate conflicts. Other global trends, such as the renewed 
rise of far-right populism and the weakening of the European Union in 
the face of Brexit and similar national pressures, may also give rise to 
new challenges. Whatever the future holds, the study and practice of 
constitutional transformation is enriched by the existence of the 
Spanish Model and the extant example of its results in Spain and 
elsewhere. 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, POLAND, 
ROMANIA AND SLOVAKIA (Routledge 2013). 
347 Garry Karparov & Thor Halvorssen, Why the Rise of Authoritarianism Is a Global 
Catastrophe, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
democracy-post/wp/2017/02/13/why-the-rise-of-authoritarianism-is-a-global-catastrophe/? 
noredirect=on&utm_term=.b0bcfaa1ab4b. 
348 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Just over four decades ago, Spain was a quasi-fascist state with an 
authoritarian government led by Generalissimo Francisco Franco. It 
was a rare holdout to the wave of democracy and constitutionalism that 
swept Europe and then much of the globe in the aftermath of World 
War II and the founding of the United Nations. In fact, due to Spain’s 
sideline role in the war and its usefulness to Western governments, 
Spain was one of the few fascist regimes to survive after the defeat of 
Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. 
With the death of Franco, Spain’s future was uncertain. But within 
a few years, the newly reigning king and remnants of Franco’s power 
structure had facilitated an unlikely democratic transformation—the 
final democratic transition in Western Europe.349 This Article 
examined and evaluated core elements of the past promise and present 
reality of Spain’s transformation from Francoist dictatorship to modern 
European democracy. It accomplished this by investigating the role of 
the Constitution of 1978 and of the distinctive Spanish Model of 
constitutional transformation in facilitating Spain’s transition to 
democracy.  
The Spanish Model refers to a relatively peaceful transition from 
authoritarianism to constitutionalism through negotiated, consensus-
based reforms without disruption of the existing legal framework 
through violence or revolution. The model allowed Spain to minimize 
internal threats to the transition, solidify popular constitutional 
elements, and postpone contentious issues. The result was a broadly 
democratic but uniquely Spanish Constitution in the modern European 
model.  
The endurance and vitality of the Constitution at forty years can be 
explained differently by historians, political scientists, and economists, 
but its success from the perspective of comparative constitutional law 
seems to rest in its successful capacity to address the issues that had 
been the source of destabilizing stress in Spain’s prior governing 
documents. The 1978 Constitution provided viable solutions to Spain’s 
pressing and recurring challenges: centrifugal tension between national 
and regional levels of government, the power of the military, the quasi-
349 Notably, the modern Portuguese transition to democracy occurred on a very similar 
timeline to the Spanish transition: a 1974 end to dictatorship in the Carnation Revolution; 
democratic elections in 1975; constitution drafted 1975–76; and the new constitution came 
into force in 1976. António Costa Pinto, Constitution-Making and the Democratization of 
Portugal: An Enduring Legacy, 34 PORTUGUESE STUD. 35 (2018). 
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governmental power and role of the Catholic Church, and the structure 
of the economy. The model helped Spain identify and codify settled 
processes for dynamic resolution of conflicts. The uniquely Spanish 
challenges were addressed in a modern state that exhibits all the 
hallmarks of democratic constitutionalism—rule of law, democracy, 
and entrenched rights protections. 
For modern Spain, the question was whether the rule of law, 
democracy, the organization of the state, the distribution of authority, 
and the protection of individual rights could viably counter the errors 
of autocracy, authoritarianism, and fascism. Forty years after the death 
of Franco, there is ample evidence that the Spanish Constitution 
addresses each of those overarching faults. This Article demonstrated 
that, despite recent, significant, and evolving challenges, constitutional 
democracy is strong in Spain and has been significantly aided by its 
constitutional text and the Spanish Model that inaugurated it. Forty 
years later, there is much to study and learn from the manner in which 
Spain successfully leveraged its constitutional process and textual 
promises to overcome its authoritarian past and solidify Spain’s place 
as a modern European democracy. 
